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Abstract. We present a model checking approach for the verification of
data flow correctness in networks during concurrent updates of the net-
work configuration. This verification problem is of great importance for
software-defined networking (SDN), where errors can lead to packet loss,
black holes, and security violations. Our approach is based on a specifica-
tion of temporal properties of individual data flows, such as the require-
ment that the flow is free of cycles. We check whether these properties
are simultaneously satisfied for all active data flows while the network
configuration is updated. To represent the behavior of the concurrent
network controllers and the resulting evolutions of the configurations,
we introduce an extension of Petri nets with a transit relation, which
characterizes the data flow caused by each transition of the Petri net.
For safe Petri nets with transits, we reduce the verification of temporal
flow properties to a circuit model checking problem that can be solved
with effective verification techniques like IC3, interpolation, and bounded
model checking. We report on encouraging experiments with a prototype
implementation based on the hardware model checker ABC.
1 Introduction
Software-defined networking (SDN) [33,7] is a networking technology that sep-
arates the packet forwarding process, called the data plane, from the routing
process, called the control plane. Updates to the routing configuration can be
initiated by a central controller and are then implemented in a distributed man-
ner in the network. The separation of data plane and control plane makes the
management of a software-defined network dramatically more efficient than a
traditional network. The model checking of network configurations and concur-
rent updates between them is a serious challenge. The distributed update process
can cause issues like forwarding loops, black holes, and incoherent routing which,
from the perspective of the end-user, result in performance degradation, broken
connections, and security violations. Correctness of concurrent network updates
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has previously been addressed with restrictions like consistent updates [39]: ev-
ery packet is guaranteed during its entire journey to either encounter the initial
routing configuration or the final routing configuration, but never a mixture in
the sense that some switches still apply the old routing configuration and others
already apply the new routing configuration. Under these restrictions, updates to
network configurations can be synthesized [13,32]. Ensuring consistent updates
is slow and expensive: switches must store multiple routing tables and messages
must be tagged with version numbers.
In this paper, we propose the verification of network configurations and con-
current updates between them. We specify desired properties of the data flows
in the network, such as the absence of loops, and then automatically check, for
a given initial routing configuration and a concurrent update, whether the spec-
ified properties are simultaneously satisfied for all active data flows while the
routing configuration is updated. This allows us to check a specific concurrent
update and to thus only impose a sequential order where this is strictly needed
to avoid an erroneous configuration during the update process.
Our approach is based on temporal logic and model checking. The control
plane of the network can naturally be specified as a Petri net. Petri nets are
convenient to differentiate between sequential and parallel update steps. The
data plane, however, is more difficult to specify. The standard flow relation of a
Petri net does not describe which ingoing token of a transition transits to which
outgoing token. In theory, such a connection could be made with colored Petri
nets [22], by using a uniquely colored token for each data flow in the network.
Since there is no bound on the number of packets, this would require infinitely
many tokens and colors to track the infinitely many data flows. To avoid this
problem, we develop an extension of Petri nets called Petri nets with transits,
which augment standard Petri nets with a transit relation. This relation specifies
the precise data flow between ingoing and outgoing tokens of a transition. In Petri
nets with transits, a single token can carry an unbounded number of data flows.
We introduce a linear-time temporal logic called Flow-LTL to specify the
correct data flows in Petri nets with transits. The logic expresses requirements
on several separate timelines: global conditions, such as fairness, are expressed
in terms of the global timeline of the system run. Requirements on individual
data flows, such as that the data flow does not enter a loop, on the other hand,
are expressed in terms of the timeline of that specific data flow. The next op-
erator, for example, refers to the next step taken by the particular data flow,
independently of the behavior of other, simultaneously active, data flows.
Concurrent updates of software-defined networks can be modeled as safe Petri
nets with transits. We show that the model checking problem of the infinite state
space of Petri nets with transits against a Flow-LTL formula can be reduced to
the LTL model checking problem for Petri nets with a finite number of tokens;
and that this model checking problem can in turn be reduced to checking a
hardware circuit against an LTL formula. This ultimately results in a standard
verification problem, for which highly efficient tools such as ABC [2] exist.
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(a) Example of a
network topology
with five switches
and six connections.
v u x y d
(b) Solid arrows show the for-
warding rules before the update,
dashed arrows the intended for-
warding rules after the update.
ingress = {v} ingress = {v}
v.fwd(u) v.fwd(x)
u.fwd(x) u.fwd(x)
x.fwd(d) x.fwd(y)
y.fwd(x) y.fwd(d)
egress = {d} egress = {d}
(c) Network programs for the
routing configurations before
and after the update.
Fig. 1: Example (due to [19]) of an update to a software-defined network.
2 Motivating Example
We motivate our approach with a typical network update problem taken from
the literature [19]. Consider the simple network topology shown in Fig. 1a. From
the global point of view, our goal is to update the network from the routing con-
figuration shown with solid lines in Fig. 1b to the routing configuration shown
with dashed lines. Such routing configurations are typically given as static Net-
Core [20,35] programs like the ones shown in Fig. 1c. The ingress and egress
sections define where packets enter and leave the network, respectively. Expres-
sions of the form v.fwd(u) define that switch v forwards packets to switch u.
It is not straightforward to see how the update from Fig. 1b can be imple-
mented in a distributed manner. If switch x is updated to forward to switch y
before y is updated to forward to switch d, then any data flow that reaches x
is sent into a loop between x and y. A correct update process must thus ensure
sequentiality between switch updates upd(y.fwd(d)) and upd(x.fwd(y)), in
this order. The only other switch with changing routing is switch v. This update
can occur in any order. A correct concurrent update would thus work as follows:
(upd(y.fwd(d)) >> upd(x.fwd(y))) || upd(v.fwd(x)),
where >> and || denote sequential and parallel composition, respectively.
Figure 2 shows a Petri net model for the network topology and the concurrent
update from the initial to the final routing configuration from Fig. 1. The right-
hand side models the control plane, where, beginning in update start , the update
of v and, concurrently, the sequential update to y and then to x is initiated.
Each marking of the net represents a control state of the network. Changes to
the control state are thus modeled by the standard flow relation. Leaving out
the control plane allows us to verify configurations of network topologies.
On the left-hand side, we model the data plane by extending the Petri net
with a transit relation. This new type of Petri nets will be defined formally in the
next section. We only depict the update to the data flow in and from switch v.
Places swu, swv, and swx represent the switches u, v, and x, respectively. The
data plane is modeled by the transit relation which indicates the extension of
the data flows during each transition at the switches.
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swv
fwdv→u
swu
v.fwd(u)
fwdv→x
swx
v.fwd(x)
ingressv
update start
updatev
concurrent
update
updatey
updatex
. . . . . .
. . .. . .
Fig. 2: Example Petri net with transits encoding the data plane on the left and
the control plane on the right. The standard flow relation, describing the flow of
tokens, is depicted by solid black arrows, the transit relation by colored arrows.
Colors that occur on both ingoing and outgoing arrows of a transition define
that the transition extends the data flow. If an outgoing arrow has a color that
does not appear on an ingoing arrow, a new data flow is initiated.
The standard flow relation is depicted by solid black arrows and the transit
relation by colored arrows. If an outgoing arrow has a color that does not appear
on an ingoing arrow, then a new data flow is initiated. In our example, data flows
are initiated by transition ingressv and the (dotted) blue arrow. Colors that occur
on both in- and outgoing arrows extend the data flow. In transition fwdv→u, the
(dotted) blue arrows indicate the extension of the data flow from swv to swu.
The (dashed) green arrows between fwdv→u and swu indicate that, in addition to
the incoming data flow from swv, there may be data flows that have previously
reached swu and have not yet departed from swu. These flows stay in swu.
Notice that ingressv, fwdv→u, and fwdv→x do not actually move tokens be-
cause of the double-headed arrows. None of these transitions change the control
state, they only model the data flow. As the switches u, v, and x remain contin-
uously active, their tokens in swu, swv, and swx are never moved. By contrast,
updatev moves the control token from v.fwd(u) to v.fwd(x), thus disabling
the data flow from swv to swu and enabling the data flow from swv to swx. We
specify the correctness of our update process with formulas of the temporal logic
Flow-LTL. The formula A d expresses connectivity requiring that all data flows
(A) eventually ( ) arrive at the egress switch d. Flow-LTL and the specification
of data flow properties will be discussed in more detail in Sec. 4 and Sec. 5. The
motivating example is formalized in App. A.
3 Petri Nets with Transits
We give the formal definition of Petri nets with transits. We assume some basic
knowledge about standard Petri nets [37]. A safe Petri net with transits (PNwT)
is a structure N = (P,T,F, In, Υ ), where the set of places P, the set of tran-
sitions T, the (control) flow relation F ⊆ (P ×T) ∪ (T ×P), and the initial
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marking In ⊆ P are as in safe Petri nets. In safe Petri nets, each reachable mark-
ing contains at most one token per place. We add the transit relation Υ of tokens
for transitions to obtain Petri nets with transits. For each transition t ∈ T, we
postulate that Υ (t) is a relation of type Υ (t) ⊆ (preN(t) ∪ {B}) × postN(t),
written in infix notation, where the symbol B denotes a start. p Υ (t) q defines
that the token in place p transits via transition t to place q and B Υ (t) q defines
that the token in place q marks the start of a new data flow via transition t.
The graphic representation of Υ (t) in Petri nets with transits uses a color coding
as can be seen in Fig. 2. Black arrows represent the usual control flow. Other
matching colors per transition are used to represent the transits of tokens. Tran-
sits allow us to specify which data flows are moved forward, split, and merged,
which data flows are removed, and which data flows are newly created.
Data flows can be of infinite length and can be created at any point in time.
Hence, the number of data flows existing in a place during an execution depends
on the causal past of the place. Therefore, we recall informally the notions of
unfoldings and runs [14,15] and apply them to Petri nets with transits. In the
unfolding of a Petri net N, every transition stands for the unique occurrence
(instance) of a transition ofN during an execution. To this end, every loop inN
is unrolled and every join of transitions in a place is expanded by duplicating
the place. Forward branching, however, is preserved. Formally, an unfolding is
a branching process βU = (NU , λU ) consisting of an occurrence net NU and
a homomorphism λU that labels the places and transitions in NU with the
corresponding elements ofN. The unfolding exhibits concurrency, causality, and
nondeterminism (forward branching) of the unique occurrences of the transitions
in N during all possible executions. A run of N is a subprocess β = (NR, ρ) of
βU , where ∀p ∈ PR : |postNR(p)| ≤ 1 holds, i.e., all nondeterminism has been
resolved but concurrency is preserved. Thus, a run formalizes one concurrent
execution of N. We introduce the unfolding of Petri nets with transits by lifting
the transit relation to the unfolding βU = (NU , λU ) . We define the relation ΥU
as follows: For any t ∈ TU , the transit relation ΥU (t) ⊆ (preNU (t) ∪ {B}) ×
postN
U
(t) is defined for all p, q ∈ PU by p ΥU (t) q ⇔ λU (p) Υ (λU (t)) λU (q).
We use the transit relation in the unfolding to introduce (data) flow chains. A
(data) flow chain in βU is a maximal sequence ξ = p0, t0, p1, t1, p2, . . . of places
in PU with connecting transitions in TU such that
1. ∃t ∈ TU : B ΥU (t) p0,
2. if ξ is infinite then for all i ≥ 0 the transit relation pi ΥU (ti) pi+1 holds,
3. if ξ is finite, say p0, t0, . . . , tn−1, pn for some n ≥ 0, then for all i with
0 ≤ i < n the transit relation pi ΥU (ti) pi+1 holds, and there is no place
q ∈ PU and no transition t ∈ TU with pn ΥU (t) q.
4 Flow-LTL for Petri Nets with Transits
We recall LTL applied to Petri nets and define our extension Flow-LTL to specify
the behavior of flow chains in Petri nets with transits. We fix a Petri net with
transits N = (P,T,F, In, Υ ) throughout the section.
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4.1 Linear Temporal Logic for Petri nets
We define AP = P ∪T as the set of atomic propositions. The set LTL of linear
temporal logic (LTL) formulas over AP has the following syntax ψ ::= true | a |
¬ψ | ψ1 ∧ ψ2 | ψ | ψ1 Uψ2, where a ∈ AP . Here, is the next operator and U
is the until operator. We use the abbreviated temporal operators (eventually)
and (always) as usual. A trace is a mapping σ : N −→ 2AP . The trace σi :
N −→ 2AP , defined by σi(j) = σ(i+ j) for all j ∈ N, is the ith suffix of σ.
We define the traces of a Petri net based on its runs. Consider a run β =
(NR, ρ) of N and a finite or infinite firing sequence ζ = M0[t0〉M1[t1〉M2 · · ·
of NR with M0 = In
R. This sequence covers β if (∀p ∈ PR ∃i ∈ N : p ∈
Mi) ∧ (∀t ∈ TR ∃i ∈ N : t = ti), i.e., all places and transitions in NR appear
in ζ. Note that several firing sequences may cover β. To each firing sequence ζ
covering β, we associate an infinite trace σ(ζ) : N −→ 2AP . If ζ is finite, say
ζ = M0[t0〉 · · · [tn−1〉Mn for some n ≥ 0, we define 1. σ(ζ)(i) = ρ(Mi) ∪ {ρ(ti)}
for 0 ≤ i < n and 2. σ(ζ)(j) = ρ(Mn) for j ≥ n. Thus, we record for 0 ≤ i < n
(case 1) all places of the original net N that label the places in the marking Mi
inNR and the transition ofN that labels the transition ti inN
R outgoing from
Mi. At the end (case 2), we stutter by repeating the set of places recorded in
σ(ζ)(n) from n onwards, but repeat no transition. If ζ is infinite we apply case 1
for all i ≥ 0 as no stuttering is needed to generate an infinite trace σ(ζ).
We define the semantics of LTL on Petri nets by N |=LTL ψ iff for all runs
β of N : β |=LTL ψ, which means that for all firing sequences ζ covering β :
σ(ζ) |=LTL ψ, where the latter refers to the usual binary satisfaction relation |=LTL
between traces σ and formulas ψ ∈ LTL defined by: σ |=LTL true, σ |=LTL a iff a ∈
σ(0), σ |=LTL ¬ψ iff not σ |=LTL ψ, σ |=LTL ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff σ |=LTL ψ1 and σ |=LTL ψ2,
σ |=LTL ψ iff σ1 |=LTL ψ, σ |=LTL ψ1 Uψ2 iff there exists a j ≥ 0 with σj |=LTL
ψ2 and for all i with 0 ≤ i < j the following holds: σi |=LTL ψ1.
4.2 Definition of Flow-LTL for Petri Nets with Transits
For Petri nets with transits, we wish to express requirements on several separate
timelines. Based on the global timeline of the system run, global conditions
like fairness and maximality can be expressed. Requirements on individual data
flows, e.g., that the data flow does not enter a loop, are expressed in terms
of the timeline of that specific data flow. Flow-LTL comprises of run formulas
ϕ specifying the usual LTL behavior on markings and data flow formulas ϕF
specifying properties of flow chains inside runs:
ϕ ::= ψ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ψ → ϕ | ϕF and ϕF ::= A ψ
where formulas ψ ∈ LTL may appear both inside ϕ and ϕF .
To each flow chain ξ in a run β, we associate an infinite flow trace σ(ξ) :
N −→ 2AP . If ξ is finite, say ξ = p0, t0 . . . , tn−1, pn for some n ≥ 0, we define
(1) σ(ξ)(i) = {ρ(pi), ρ(ti)} for 0 ≤ i < n and (2) σ(ξ)(j) = {ρ(pn)} for j ≥ n.
Thus, we record for 0 ≤ i < n (case 1) the place and the transition of
the original net N that label the place pi in N
R and the transition ti in N
R
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outgoing from pi. At the end (case 2), we stutter by repeating the place recorded
in σ(ξ)(n) infinitely often. No transition is repeated in this case.
If ξ is infinite, say ξ = p0, t0, p1, t1, p2, . . . , we apply case 1 for all i ≥ 0. Here,
no stuttering is needed to generate an infinite flow trace σ(ξ) and each element
of the trace consists of a place and a transition.
A Petri net with transits N satisfies ϕ, abbr. N |= ϕ, if the following holds:
N |= ϕ iff for all runs β of N : β |= ϕ
β |= ϕ iff for all firing sequences ζ covering β : β, σ(ζ) |= ϕ
β, σ(ζ) |= ψ iff σ(ζ) |=LTL ψ
β, σ(ζ) |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff β, σ(ζ) |= ϕ1 and β, σ(ζ) |= ϕ2
β, σ(ζ) |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff β, σ(ζ) |= ϕ1 or β, σ(ζ) |= ϕ2
β, σ(ζ) |= ψ → ϕ iff β, σ(ζ) |= ψ implies β, σ(ζ) |= ϕ
β, σ(ζ) |= A ψ iff for all flow chains ξ of β : σ(ξ) |=LTL ψ
5 Example Specifications
We illustrate Flow-LTL with examples from the literature on software-defined
networking. Specifications on data flows like loop and drop freedom are encoded
as run formulas. Fairness assumptions for switches are given as run formulas.
5.1 Data Flow Formulas
We show how properties from the literature can be encoded as data flow formulas.
For a network topology, let Sw be the set of all switches, Ingr ⊆ Sw the ingress
switches, and Egr ⊆ Sw the egress switches with Ingr∩Egr = ∅. The connections
between switches are given by Con ⊆ Sw × Sw .
Loop freedom. Loop freedom [29] requires that a data flow visits every switch
at most once. In Sec. 2, we outlined that arbitrarily ordered updates can lead
to loops in the network. The following data flow formula expresses that each
data flow is required to not visit a non-egress switch anymore after it has been
forwarded and therefore left that switch (realized via the U -operator):
A (
∧
s∈Sw\Egr
s→ (sU ¬s))
Drop freedom. Drop freedom [38] requires that no data packets are dropped.
Packets are dropped by a switch if no forwarding is configured. We specify that
all data flows not yet at the egress switches are extended by transitions from
a set Fwd encoding the connections Con between switches (for details of the
encoding see App. A.2). We obtain the following data flow formula:
A (
∧
e∈Egr
¬e→
∨
f∈Fwd
f)
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sww
sw x
sw y
swz
w.fwd(x)
w.fwd(y)
x.fwd(z)
y.fwd(z)
upd2upd1
Fig. 3: Concurrent network update that does not preserve drop freedom.
sww
sw x
sw y
swm
sw u
sw v
swz
w.fwd(x)
w.fwd(y)
m.fwd(u)
m.fwd(v)
upd2upd1
Fig. 4: Concurrent network update that does not preserve packet coherence.
Example 1. Figure 3 shows an example update that violates drop freedom. Pack-
ets are forwarded from switch w to switch z either via switch x or via switch y. If
the forwarding of x is deactivated by firing transition upd2 before the forwarding
of switch w is updated by firing upd1, then all packets still forwarded from w to
x are dropped as no outgoing transitions from x will be enabled.
Packet coherence. Packet coherence [1] requires that every data flow follows
one of two paths: either the path according to the routing before the update or
the path according to the routing after the update. The paths Path1 and Path2
are defined as the sets of switches of the forwarding route before and after the
update. This results in the following data flow formula:
A( (
∨
s∈Path1
s) ∨ (
∨
s∈Path2
s))
Example 2. In Fig. 4, the encoding of an update to a double-diamond network
topology [8] is depicted as a simple example for a packet incoherent update.
Before firing the update transitions upd1 and upd2, packets are forwarded via
switches x, m, and u, after the complete update, via switches y, m, and v. If m is
updated by firing transition upd2 while packets have been forwarded to x then
these packets are forwarded along the incoherent path x, m, and v.
We note that loop and drop freedom are incomparable requirements. Together,
they imply that all packets reach one egress switch. Connectivity, in turn, implies
drop freedom but not loop freedom, because an update can allow some loops.
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5.2 Run Formulas
Data flow formulas require behavior on the maximal flow of packets and switches
are assumed to forward packets in a fair manner. Both types of assumptions are
expressed in Flow-LTL as run formulas. We typically consider implications be-
tween run formulas and data flow formulas.
Maximality. A run β is interleaving-maximal if, whenever some transition is
enabled, some transition will be taken: β |= (∨t∈T pre (t)→ ∨t∈T t).
A run β is concurrency-maximal if, when a transition t is from a moment on al-
ways enabled, infinitely often a transition t′ (including t itself) sharing a precon-
dition with t is taken: β |= ∧t∈T( pre (t) → ∨ p ∈ pre (t), t′ ∈ post (p) t′).
Fairness. A run β is weakly fair w.r.t. a transition t if, whenever t is always
enabled after some point, t is taken infinitely often: β |= pre (t)→ t.
A run β is strongly fair w.r.t. t if, whenever t is enabled infinitely often, t is
taken infinitely often: β |= pre (t)→ t.
6 Model Checking Flow-LTL on Petri Nets with Transits
We solve the model checking problem of a Flow-LTL formula ϕ on a Petri net
with transits N in three steps:
1. N is encoded as a Petri net N> without transits obtained by composing
suitably modified copies of N such that each flow subformula in ϕ can be
checked for correctness using the corresponding copy.
2. ϕ is transformed to an LTL-formula ϕ> which skips the uninvolved compo-
sition copies when evaluating run and flow parts, respectively.
3. N> and ϕ> are encoded in a circuit and fair reachability is checked with a
hardware model checker to answer if N |= ϕ holds.
Given a Petri net with transitsN = (P,T,F, In, Υ ) and a Flow-LTL formula ϕ
with subformulas ϕFi = Aψi, where i = 1, . . . , n for some n ∈ N, we produce a
Petri net N> = (P>,T>,F>,F>I , In
>) with inhibitor arcs (denoted by F>I )
and an LTL formula ϕ>. An inhibitor arc is a directed arc from a place p to a
transition t, which only enables t if p contains no token. Graphically, those arcs
are depicted as arrows equipped with a circle on their arrow tail.
6.1 From Petri Nets with Transits to P/T Petri nets
We informally introduce the construction ofN> and Fig. 5 visualizes the process
by an example. Details for this and the following constructions, as well as all
proofs corresponding to Sec. 6 can be found in App. B.
The original part of N> (denoted by N>O ) is the original net N without
transit relation and is used to check the run part of the formula. To N>O , a
subnet for each subformula Aψi of ϕ is composed (denoted by N>i , with places
P>i and transitions T
>
i ), which serves for checking the corresponding data flow
part of the formula ϕ. The subnet introduces the possibility to decide for the
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tracking of up to one specific flow chain by introducing a copy [p]i of each place
p ∈ P and transitions simulating the transits. The place [ι]i serves for starting
the tracking. Each run of a subnet simulates one possible flow chain of N, i.e.,
every firing sequence covering any run of N yields a flow chain.
in
t
out
−→o
s
[in]1
[out ]1
t
t
t
t
tV1
−→
t 1
−→s 1
s
s
sV1
s
[ι]1
−→
t 2
−→s 2
[in]n
[out ]n
t
t1
t t2
t
t3
t
tVn
−→
t n
−→s n
s s1
s
sVn
s s2
[ι]n
in
t
out
s
N N>
N>O N
>
1 N
>
n
Fig. 5: An overview of the constructed P/T Petri net N> (on the right) for an
example Petri net with transits N (on the left) and n flow subformulas Aψi.
An activation token iterates sequentially through these components via places−→
t for t ∈ T. In each step, the active component has to fire exactly one transition
and pass the active token to the next component. The sequence starts by N>O
firing a transition t and proceeds through every subnet simulating the data flows
according to the transits of t. This implies that the subnets have to either move
their data flow via a t-labelled transition t′ (λ(t′) = t) or use the skipping
transition tVi if their chain is not involved in the firing of t or a newly created
chain should not be considered in this run.
Lemma 1 (Size of the Constructed Net). The constructed Petri net N>
has O(|N| · n) places and O(|N|3 · n) transitions.
6.2 From Flow-LTL Formulas to LTL Formulas
The two different kinds of timelines of ϕ are encoded in the LTL formula ϕ>.
On the one hand, the data flow formulas Aψi in ϕ are now checked on the
corresponding subnets N>i and, on the other hand, the run formula part of ϕ
is checked on the original part of the net N>O . In both cases, we need to ignore
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places and transitions from other parts of the composition. This is achieved by
replacing each next operator φ and atomic proposition t ∈ T inside ϕ with an
until operator. Transitions which are not representing the considered timeline are
called unrelated, others related. Via the until operator, all unrelated transitions
can fire until a related transition is fired. This is formalized in Tab. 1 using the
sets O = T> \ T and Oi = (T> \ T>i ) ∪ {tVi ∈ T>i | t ∈ T}, for the
unrelated transitions of the original part and of the subnets, respectively. The
related transitions of the original part are given by T and for the subnets by
Mi(t) = {t′ ∈ T>i \ {tVi} | λ(t′) = t} and Mi = T>i \ {tVi ∈ T>i | t ∈ T}.
Table 1: Row 1 considers the substitutions in the run part of ϕ, row 2 the
substitutions in each subformula ϕFi . Column 1 considers simultaneously sub-
stitutions, column 2 substitutions from the inner- to the outermost occurrence.
t ∈ T φ
(
∨
t′∈O t
′)U t ((
∨
t∈O t)U ((
∨
t′∈T t
′) ∧ φ)) ∨ ( (¬(∨t′∈T t′)) ∧ φ)
(
∨
to∈Oi to)U (
∨
tm∈Mi(t) tm) ((
∨
t∈Oi t)U ((
∨
t∈Mi t) ∧ φ)) ∨ ( (¬(
∨
t∈Mi t)) ∧ φ)
Additionally, every atomic proposition p ∈ P in the scope of a flow operator
is simultaneously substituted with its corresponding place [p]i of the subnet.
Every flow subformula Aψi is substituted with [ι]i ∨ ([ι]i Uψ′i), where [ι]i
represents that no flow chain is tracked and ψ′i is the result of the substitutions
of atomic propositions and next operators described before. The until operator
in [ι]i Uψ
′
i ensures to only check the flow subformula at the time the chain is
created. Finally, restricting runs to not end in any of the subnets yields the final
formula
ϕ> = ( −→o )→ ϕA
with −→o being the activation place of the original part of the net and ϕA the
result of the substitution of all flow subformulas.
Lemma 2 (Size of the Constructed Formula). The size of the constructed
LTL formula ϕ> is in O(|N|3 · n · |ϕ|).
Lemma 3 (Correctness of the Transformation). For a Petri net with tran-
sits N and a Flow-LTL formula ϕ, there exists a safe P/T Petri net N> with
inhibitor arcs and an LTL formula ϕ> such that N |= ϕ iff N> |=LTL ϕ>.
6.3 Petri Net Model Checking with Circuits
We translate the model checking of an LTL formula ψ with places and transitions
as atomic propositions on a safe P/T Petri net with inhibitor arcs N to a model
checking problem on a circuit. We define the circuit CN simulating N and an
adapted formula ψ′, which can be checked by modern model checkers [9,18,2].
A circuit C = (I ,O,L ,F ) consists of boolean variables I , O, L for
input, output, latches, and a boolean formula F over I ×L × O ×L , which
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is deterministic in I × L . The formula F can be seen as transition relation
from a valuation of the input variables and the current state of the latches
to the valuation of the output variables and the next state of the latches. A
circuit C can be interpreted as a Kripke structure such that the satisfiability
of a formula ψ′ (denoted by C |= ψ′) can be defined by the satisfiability in the
Kripke structure.
The desired circuit CN has a latch for each place p ∈ P to store the current
marking, a latch i for initializing this marking with In in the first step, and
a latch e for handling invalid inputs. The inputs I consider the firing of a
transition t ∈ T. The latch i is true in every but the first step. The latch e is true
whenever invalid values are applied on the inputs, i.e., the firing of not enabled,
or more than one transition. The marking latches are updated according to the
firing of the valid transition. If currently no valid input is applied, the marking
is kept from the previous step. There is an output for each place (the current
marking), for each transition (the transition leading to the next marking), and
for the current value of the invalid latch. We create ψ′ by skipping the initial
step and allowing invalid inputs only at the end of a trace:
ψ′ = ( (e→ e)→ ψ).
This allows for finite firing sequences. The concrete formulaF , the Kripke struc-
ture, and the corresponding proofs can be found in App. B. The circuit CN can
be encoded as an and-inverter graph in the Aiger format [4].
Lemma 4 (Correctness of the Circuit). For a safe P/T Petri net with in-
hibitor arcs N and an LTL formula ψ, there exists a circuit CN with |P| + 2
latches and O(|N|2) gates, and ψ′ of size O(|ψ|) such thatN |=LTL ψ iff CN |= ψ′.
Theorem 1. A safe Petri net with transits N can be checked against a Flow-
LTL formula ϕ in single-exponential time in the size of N and ϕ.
Checking a safe Petri net with transits against Flow-LTL has a PSPACE-hard
lower bound because checking a safe Petri net against LTL is a special case of
this problem and reachability of safe Petri nets is PSPACE-complete.
7 Implementation Details and Experimental Results
We implemented our model checking approach in a prototype tool based on the
tool Adam [16]. Our tool takes as input a Flow-LTL specification and a Petri net
with transits, and carries out the transformation described in Sec. 6 to obtain
an LTL formula and an Aiger circuit. We then use MCHyper [18] to combine the
circuit and the LTL formula into another Aiger circuit. MCHyper is a verification
tool for HyperLTL [11], which subsumes LTL. The actual model checking is
carried out by the hardware model checker ABC [2]. ABC provides a toolbox
of state-of-the-art verification and falsification techniques like IC3 [5]/PDR [12],
interpolation (INT) [34], and bounded model checking [3] (BMC, BMC2, BMC3).
We prepared an artifact for to replicate our experimental results [21].
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Our experimental results cover two benchmark families (SF/RP) and a case
study (RU) from software-defined networking on real-world network topologies:
Switch Failure (SF) (Parameter: n switches): From a sequence of n switches
with the ingress at the beginning and the egress at the end, a failing switch is
chosen at random and removed. Then, data flows are bypassed from the prede-
cessor to the successor of the failing switch. Every data flow reaches the egress
node no matter of the update (connectivity).
Redundant Pipeline (RP) (Parameters: n1 switches in pipeline one / n2
switches in pipeline two / v version): The base version (B) contains two dis-
joint sequences of switches from the ingress to the egress, possibly with differing
length. For this and the next two versions, it is required that each data flow
reaches the egress node (connectivity) and is only forwarded via the first or the
second pipeline (packet coherence). Update version (U): Two updates are added
that can concurrently remove the first node of any pipeline and return the data
flows to the ingress. If both updates happen, data flows do not reach the egress.
Returning the data flows violates packet coherence. Mutex version (M): A mutex
is added to the update version such that at most one pipeline can be broken.
Updates can happen sequentially such that data flows are in a cycle through
the ingress. Correct version (C): The requirements are weakened such that each
data flow only has to reach the egress when updates do not occur infinitely often.
Routing Update (RU) is a case study based on realistic software-defined net-
works. We picked 31 real-world network topologies from [26]. For each network,
we choose at random an ingress switch, an egress switch, and a loop- and drop-
free initial configuration between the two. For a different, random final con-
figuration, we build a sequential update in reverse from egress to ingress. The
update overlaps with the initial configuration at some point during the update
or is activated from the ingress in the last step. It is checked if all packets reach
the egress (T) and if all packets reach another specific switch as an egress (F).
Table 2 presents our experimental results and indicates for each benchmark
the model checking approach with the best performance (cf. App. C for the full
table). In the benchmarks where the specification is satisfied (3), IC3 is the clear
winner, in benchmarks where the specification is violated (7), the best approach
is bounded model checking with dynamic unrolling (BMC2/3). The results are
encouraging: hardware model checking is effective for circuits constructed by our
transformation with up to 400 latches and 27619 gates; falsification is possible
for larger circuits with up to 1288 latches and 269943 gates. As a result, we
were able to automatically verify with our prototype implementation updates
for networks with topologies of up to 10 switches (#S) and to falsify updates
for topologies with up to 38 switches within the time bound of 30 minutes.
We investigated the cost of specifications drop and loop freedom compared
with connectivity and packet coherence. Table 3 exemplarily shows the results
for network topology Napnet from RU. Connectivity, packet coherence and loop
freedom have comparable runtime due to similar formula and circuit sizes. Drop
freedom is defined over transitions and, hence, expensive for our transformation.
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Table 2: Experimental results from the benchmark families Switch Failure (SF)
and Redundant Pipeline (RP), and the case study Routing Update (RU). The
results are the average over five runs on an Intel i7-2700K CPU with 3.50 GHz,
32 GB RAM, and a timeout of 30 minutes.
PNwT Translated PN Circuit Result
Ben. Par. #S |P| |T| |ϕ| |P>| |T>| |ψ′| Lat. Gat. Sec. Algo. |=
SF 3 4 4 5 35 17 22 60 90 2796 2.7 IC3 3
· · · · · · · · ·
9 10 10 11 95 35 46 138 186 8700 1359.9 IC3 3
10 11 11 12 105 38 50 151 202 9964 TO - ?
RP 1/1/B 4 4 5 43 17 22 68 100 2989 4.0 IC3 3
· · · · · · · · ·
4/4/B 10 10 11 103 35 46 146 196 8893 646.4 IC3 3
4/5/B 11 11 12 113 38 50 159 212 10157 TO - ?
1/1/U 6 6 9 63 25 36 100 136 5535 1.6 BMC2 7
· · · · · · · · ·
5/4/U 13 13 16 133 46 64 191 248 14523 945.1 BMC3 7
5/5/U 14 14 17 143 49 68 204 264 16127 TO - ?
1/1/M 6 9 11 63 30 42 106 146 6908 8.1 BMC3 7
· · · · · · · · ·
4/3/M 11 14 16 113 45 62 171 226 13573 1449.6 BMC2 7
4/4/M 12 15 17 123 48 66 184 242 15146 TO - ?
1/1/C 6 9 11 70 30 42 113 151 7023 63.1 IC3 3
· · · · · · · · ·
3/3/C 10 13 15 110 42 58 165 215 12195 1218.0 IC3 3
3/4/C 11 14 16 120 45 62 178 231 13688 TO - ?
RU Arpanet196912T 4 14 10 117 31 39 154 188 7483 22.7 IC3 3
Arpanet196912F 4 14 10 117 31 39 154 188 7483 2.0 BMC3 7
NapnetT 6 23 17 199 48 64 254 292 15875 95.1 IC3 3
NapnetF 6 23 17 199 48 64 254 292 15875 4.7 BMC3 7
· · · · · · · · ·
NetrailT 7 30 23 271 62 88 344 380 26101 145.3 IC3 3
NetrailF 7 30 23 271 62 88 344 380 26101 58.3 BMC3 7
Arpanet19706T 9 33 24 281 67 89 354 400 27619 507.8 IC3 3
Arpanet19706F 9 33 24 281 67 89 354 400 27619 49.7 BMC3 7
NsfcnetT 10 31 22 261 65 87 334 376 26181 304.8 IC3 3
NsfcnetF 10 31 22 261 65 87 334 376 26181 8.4 BMC3 7
· · · · · · · · ·
TwarenF 20 65 45 531 130 170 664 736 87493 461.5 BMC3 7
MarnetF 20 77 57 679 156 224 854 908 138103 746.1 BMC3 7
JanetlenseF 20 91 71 847 184 280 1064 1104 203595 514.2 BMC2 7
HarnetF 21 71 50 593 143 193 744 812 108415 919.0 BMC3 7
Belnet2009F 21 71 50 597 145 199 754 816 113397 1163.3 BMC2 7
· · · · · · · · ·
UranF 24 56 38 449 106 133 552 618 57950 143.2 BMC3 7
KentmanFeb2008F 26 82 56 669 167 223 844 920 142291 111.2 BMC3 7
Garr200212F 27 86 59 703 174 232 884 964 153509 324.2 BMC3 7
IinetF 31 104 73 871 210 288 1094 1176 227153 1244.5 BMC3 7
KentmanJan2011F 38 117 79 943 236 312 1184 1288 269943 112.6 BMC3 7
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Table 3: For the network topology Napnet and a concurrent update between two
randomly generated topologies, our four standard requirements are checked.
PN w. Transits Translated PN Circuit Result
Ben. Req. |P| |T| |ϕ| |P>| |T>| |ψ′| Latches Gates Sec. Algo. |=
Napnet connectivity 23 17 199 48 64 254 292 15875 95.1 IC3 3
p. coherence 23 17 208 48 64 267 298 16041 31.9 IC3 3
loop-free 23 17 237 48 64 296 305 16289 52.6 INT 3
drop-free 23 17 257 48 64 2288 325 30449 165.9 IC3 3
8 Related Work
There is a large body of work on software-defined networks, see [28] for a good
introduction. Specific solutions that were proposed for the network update prob-
lem include consistent updates [39,8] (cf. the introduction), dynamic schedul-
ing [23], and incremental updates [25]. Model checking, including both explicit
and SMT-based approaches, has previously been used to verify software-defined
networks [6,31,30,43,1,36]. Closest to our work are models of networks as Kripke
structures to use model checking for synthesis of correct network updates [13,32].
While they pursue synthesis, rather than verification of network updates, the ap-
proach is still based on a model checking algorithm that is called in each step
of the construction of a sequence of updates. The model checking subroutine of
the synthesizer assumes that each packet sees at most one switch that was up-
dated after the packet entered the network. This restriction is implemented with
explicit waits, which can afterwards often be removed by heuristics. Our model
checking routine does not require this assumption. As it therefore allows for more
general updates, it would be very interesting to add the new model checking al-
gorithm into the synthesis procedure. Flow correctness also plays a role in other
application areas like access control in physical spaces. Flow properties that are
of interest in this setting, such as “from every room in the building there is a
path to exit the building”, have been formalized in a temporal logic [42].
There is a significant number of model checking tools (e.g., [40,41,24]) for
Petri nets and an annual model checking contest [27]. In this contest, however,
only LTL formulas with places as atomic propositions are checked. To the best of
our knowledge, other model checking tools for Petri nets do not provide places
and transitions as atomic propositions. Our encoding needs to reason about
places and transitions to pose fairness conditions on the firing of transitions.
9 Conclusion
We have presented a model checking approach for the verification of data flow
correctness in networks during concurrent updates of the network configuration.
Key ingredients of the approach are Petri nets with transits, which superimpose
the transit relation of data flows onto the flow relation of Petri nets, and Flow-
LTL, which combines the specification of local data flows with the specification
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of global control. The model checking problem for Petri nets with transits and
Flow-LTL specifications reduces to a circuit model checking problem. Our pro-
totype tool implementation can verify and falsify realistic concurrent updates of
software-defined networks with specifications like packet coherence.
In future work, we plan to extend this work to the synthesis of concurrent
updates. Existing synthesis techniques use model checking as a subroutine to
verify the correctness of the individual update steps [13,32]. We plan to study
Flow-LTL specifications in the setting of Petri games [17], which describe the
existence of controllers for asynchronous distributed processes. This would allow
us to synthesize concurrent network updates without a central controller.
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Appendix
A Encoding of Concurrent Updates for SDN
In this section of the appendix, we outline how updates to a configured network
topology can be encoded into Petri nets with transits. First, we recall network
topologies, network configurations, and concurrent updates. Second, we encode
a network topology as data plane into Petri nets with transits. Third, we en-
code a corresponding network configuration and a concurrent update to this
configuration into usual Petri nets (without transits).
A.1 Network Topology, Configurations, and Updates
A network topology T is given as a finite, connected, undirected graph T =
(Sw ,Con) with the non-empty set of switches Sw as vertices and the non-empty
set of connections Con ⊆ Sw × Sw as edges. The configuration of a network
topology is defined by a static NetCore [20,35] program with the following syntax:
ingress = Ingr;
forwarding
egress = Egr;
such that Ingr ⊆ Sw is the non-empty set of ingress switches where packets en-
ter the network topology and Egr ⊆ Sw is the non-empty set of egress switches
to which packets should be forwarded. It is required that Ingr ∩ Egr = ∅.
forwarding is a list of forwarding rules of the form x.fwd(y); with x, y ∈ Sw .
Such a rule defines that switch x forwards packets to switch y. Each switch oc-
curs at most once on the left hand side of the list of forwarding rules, making
the forwarding decision of switches deterministic. If a switch is not configured,
then all packets are dropped at that switch.
A concurrent update to the forwarding rules is given by the following syntax:
switch update ::= upd(x.fwd(z)) (x, z ∈ Sw)
sequential update ::= (update >> update >> ... >> update)
parallel update ::= (update || update || ... || update)
update ::= switch update | sequential update | parallel update
where, for efficiency reasons, each switch is updated at most once.
Update statements of the form upd(x.fwd(z)) define that a given config-
uration is altered by changing the forwarding rule x.fwd(y) to x.fwd(z) or
by adding x.fwd(z) to the given configuration if switch x is not configured in
forwarding. The first case updates the forwarding rule of switch x from switch y
to switch z whereas the second case configures the switch x to now forward pack-
ets to switch z (instead of dropping the packets). The sequential update defines a
sequence of updates, where the next update is only carried out after the current
update is finished. The parallel update defines that all updates can happen in
parallel and no assumptions about their order can be made.
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Given a network topology T = (Sw ,Con), an initial configuration ingress =
Ingr;forwarding; egress = Egr;, and an update, we describe the construc-
tion of the corresponding Petri net with transitsN = (PD∪PC ,TD∪TC ,FD∪
FC , InD ∪ InC , ΥD) consisting of a sub-Petri net with transits
ND = (PD ,TD ,FD , InD , ΥD) to encode the topology and initial configura-
tion, and a sub-Petri net without transits NC = (PC ,TC ,FC , InC) encoding
the update to the initial configuration.
A.2 Data Plane as Petri Net with Transits
As the flow of packets is modeled by transits, we model switches and their connec-
tions with tokens that remain in corresponding places. The initial configuration
puts tokens in additional places such that only the transitions corresponding to
the configured forwarding are enabled. Specific transitions model ingress switches
where new data flows begin. These data flows are then extended by firing the
enabled forwarding rules without moving any tokens. We thereby model any
order of newly generated packets and their forwarding. We assume that for all
connections between two switches x and y, both (x, y) and (y, x) are in Con.
We create a place for each switch and for each direction of connections be-
tween two switches: PD = {swx | x ∈ Sw} ∪ {x.fwd(y) | (x, y) ∈ Con}.
We create a transition for each direction of connections between switches and
for each ingress switch: TD = {fwdx→y | (x, y) ∈ Con}∪{ingressx | x ∈ Ingr}.
In Sec. 5, we call this set of transitions Fwd when defining drop freedom.
We define the flow relation such that each transition fwdx→y has the places
swx, swy, and x.fwd(y) in its preset and postset, and each transition ingressx
has the place swx in its preset and postset:F
D = {(swx, fwdx→y), (swy, fwdx→y),
(x.fwd(y), fwdx→y), (fwdx→y, swx), (fwdx→y, swy), (fwdx→y, x.fwd(y)) | (x, y) ∈
Con}∪{(swx, ingressx), (ingressx, swx) | x ∈ Ingr}. All transitions are weak fair.
The initial marking contains all switches and the initial forwarding rules from
forwarding: InD = {swx | x ∈ Sw} ∪ forwarding.
The transit relation of transitions of the form fwdx→y defines a data flow
from switch x to switch y and maintains data flows in switch y. Transitions
of the form ingressx create a new data flow in switch x and maintain data
flows in switch x: ΥD = {(swxΥ (fwdx→y)swy), (swyΥ (fwdx→y)swy) | (x, y) ∈
Con} ∪ {(BΥ (ingressx)swx), (swxΥ (ingressx)swx) | x ∈ Ingr}.
A.3 Control Plane as Petri Net
The subnet for the update has no transit relation but moves tokens from and
to places of the form x.fwd(y) such that transitions corresponding to other
forwarding rules become enabled. The order of these updates is defined by the
nesting of the sequential and the parallel operator in the update.
The update is realized by initially one token moving through dedicated places.
A parallel update temporarily increases the number of tokens and reduces it
upon completion to one. The update and each of its sub-expressions have a
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unique starting and finishing place. The following construction defines the update
behavior between start and finish places and connects finish and start places to
ensure sequentiality and concurrency depending on the sub-expression structure.
For a given update, let SwU be the set of switch updates in it, SeU the set of
sequential updates in it, and PaU the set of parallel updates in it. Depending
on update’s type, it is added to the respective set.
We introduce start and finish places for all elements of the three sets SwU ,
SeU , and PaU : PC = {upd start , updfinish | upd ∈ SwU } ∪ {seqstart , seqfinish |
seq ∈ SeU } ∪ {par start , parfinish | par ∈ PaU }. All transitions are weak fair.
Each switch update is represented by one transition. Each sequential update
of length n is represented by n+2 transitions, where the first and last transition
start and finish the sequential update, and the n transitions in between connect
the steps of the sequential update. Each concurrent update is represented by an
open and a close transition: TC = {upd | upd ∈ SwU } ∪ {seq0, . . . , seqn+1 |
seq ∈ SeU ∧ |seq | = n} ∪ {paropen , parclose | par ∈ PaU }.
There are two mutually exclusive cases for the flow of switch updates where
(1) a previous configuration is updated and (2) a new configuration is added: For
(1), we search for a previous configuration x.fwd(y) and move the token to the
new configuration x.fwd(z): FCSwU1 = {(upd(x.fwd(z))start , upd(x.fwd(z))),
(x.fwd(y), upd(x.fwd(z))), (upd(x.fwd(z)), x.fwd(z)), (upd(x.fwd(z)),
upd(x.fwd(z))finish) | upd(x.fwd(z)) ∈ SwU∧upd(x.fwd(y)) ∈ forwarding}.
If no corresponding previous configuration exists (2), a new token is created
at x.fwd(z): FCSwU2 = {(upd(x.fwd(z))start , upd(x.fwd(z))),
(upd(x.fwd(z)), upd(x.fwd(z))finish), (upd(x.fwd(z)), x.fwd(z)) |
upd(x.fwd(z)) ∈ SwU ∧ @y ∈ Sw : upd(x.fwd(y)) ∈ forwarding}.
For each sequential update, we add flows to the corresponding transitions
such that the Petri net can move from the start place of the sequential update
to the start place of its first direct sub-formula (0), then from the finish of each di-
rect sub-formula (i−1) to the start place of the next direct sub-formula (i), and in
the end, from the finish place of the last direct sub-formula (n) to the finish place
of the sequential update: FCSeU = {(seqstart , seq0), (seq0, substart) | seq ∈ SeU ∧
sub is the first direct sub-expression of seq} ∪ {(subfinishi−1 , seq i), (seq i, substarti ) |
seq ∈ SeU ∧ |seq | = n ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ subi−1 and subi are the i− 1-th and ith
direct sub-formula of seq}∪{(subfinish , seqn+1), (seqn+1, seqfinish) | seq ∈ SeU ∧
|seq | = n ∧ sub is the last direct sub-expression of seq}.
Each concurrent update is opened to the starting places of its direct sub-
formulas and closed from the finish places of its direct sub-formulas:
FCPaU = {(par start , paropen), (parclose , parfinish)} ∪ {(paropen , substart),
(subfinish , parclose) | par ∈ PaU ∧ sub is direct sub-expression of PaU }.
We add all these sets into the flow of the Petri net FC = FCSwU1 ∪FCSwU2 ∪
FCSeU ∪FCPaU and define the initial marking to contain one token in the starting
place of the update: InC = {updatestart}.
This construction gives us a Petri net with transits that models the concur-
rent update for the given network topology and initial configuration. The set of
egress switches can be used to formulate requirements.
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B Proofs for the Transformation
In this section of the appendix, we provide details to Sec. 6. Firstly, we give a
formal definition of the construction of the P/T Petri net with inhibitor arcs
N> from a Petri net with transits N and a Flow-LTL formula ϕ described in
Sec. 6.1. Secondly, the formal transformation from a Flow-LTL formula ϕ to
an LTL formula ϕ> (described in Sec. 6.2) is given. Thirdly, the correctness of
these transformations are proven by mutually transforming the counterexam-
ples. Finally, the formal construction of the circuit (outlined in Sec. 6.3), its
corresponding Kripke structure, and its correctness are presented. By this, the
proofs for all lemmata and the theorem of this paper are made available.
B.1 Formal Construction of the Net Transformation
We introduce a set of identifiers ID and an injective naming function νN : P ∪
T → ID for every Petri net N = (P,T,F, In) (and all of its extensions) which
uniquely identifies every place and transition of a given net. If the netN is clear
from the context, we omit the subscript and only write ν. Furthermore, we often
omit the predicate p ∈ P ∧ ν(p) = identifier and t ∈ T ∧ ν(t) = identifier ,
respectively, in formulas and only use identifier instead of p or t, respectively,
within the formula to keep the presentation short.
The construction of a Petri net with transits to a standard P/T Petri net
with inhibitor arcs is given by the following definition.
Definition 1 (Petri Net with Transits to a P/T Petri Net). Let N =
(P,T,F, In, Υ ) be a Petri net with transits and ϕ a Flow-LTL formula with
n ∈ N subformulas Aψi, for i = 1, . . . , n. We define a P/T-Petri net with
inhibitor arcs N> = (P>,T>,F>,F>I , In
>), with
P>
def .
= P>o ∪
⋃
i∈{1,...,n}
P>i , T
> def .= T>o ∪
⋃
i∈{1,...,n}
T>i
and a partial function λ : T> ∪P> → T ∪P which maps the elements to its
corresponding original ones. The smallest sets and sets P>o ,P
>
i ,T
>
0 , T
>
i , F
>,
and F>I fulfilling the following constraints define the net N
>.
By constraint (o) it is ensured that all places, transitions, and flows of the
original net N are also existent in N>. The labeling and the identifiers are
copied.
(o) P>o ⊃ P ∧T>o = T ∧F> ⊃ F ∧∀p> ∈ P : λ(p>) = p∧∀t> ∈ T : λ(t>) =
t ∧ ∀p> ∈ P : ν(p>) = ν(p) ∧ ∀t> ∈ T : ν(t>) = ν(t)
With the following constraints starting with s, the additional places, transitions,
and flows of the subnets are defined for each subformula Aψi. Let I = {1, . . . , n}.
In (s1), a copy of every original place for each subnet is demanded for tracking
the flow chains.
(s1) ∀i ∈ I : ∀p ∈ P : ∃p> ∈ P>i : λ(p>) = p ∧ ν(p>) = [ν(p)]i
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To consider if any chain has been tracked, an initial place [ι]i for every subnet
is defined via constraint (s2).
(s2) ∀i ∈ I : ∃p> ∈ P>i : ν(p>) = [ι]i
Constraint (s3) ensures the existence of transitions simulating the creation of
a flow chain during the run. Hence, for every starting flow chain there is a
transition in each subnet, which takes the initial token from [ι]i and moves it
according to the corresponding transit.
(s3) ∀i ∈ I : ∀t ∈ T : ∀(B, q) ∈ Υ (t) : ∃t> ∈ T>i : ([ι]i , t>) ∈ F>∧ (t>, [ν(q)]i) ∈
F> ∧ λ(t>) = t ∧ ν(t>) = ν(t)ν(q)i
In constraint (s4), this is similarly done for each transit of each transition.
(s4) ∀i ∈ I : ∀t ∈ T : ∀(p, q) ∈ Υ (t) : ∃t> ∈ T>i : ([ν(p)]i , t>) ∈ F> ∧
(t>, [ν(q)]i) ∈ F> ∧ λ(t>) = t ∧ ν(t>) = ν(t)(ν(p),ν(q))i
Constraint (s5) treats the situation that the currently tracked flow chain is inde-
pendent of the firing of the previous original transition. Thus, a skipping tran-
sition is demanded for every original transition t in each subnet which is only
allowed to fire when the considered chain of the subnet is not moved by the tran-
sits of t, i.e., no corresponding places of the preset of t are occupied.
(s5) ∀i ∈ I : ∀t ∈ T : ∃t> ∈ T>i : ∀p ∈ •t : ([ν(p)]i , t>) ∈ F>I ∧ λ(t>) =
t ∧ ν(t>) = ν(t)Vi
The following four constraints are used to connect the components sequentially.
Constraint (a) ensures one activation place −→o for the original net, and one
activation place
−−→
ν(t)i for every original transition t ∈ T for each subnet.
(a) ∃p> ∈ P>o : ν(p>) = −→o ∧ ∀i ∈ I : ∀t ∈ T : ∃p> ∈ P>i : ν(p>) =
−−→
ν(t)i
Constraint (mO) let every original transition t ∈ T>o take the activation token
from −→o and moves it to the activation place −−−→ν(t)0 of all transition of the first
subnet which are labelled with t to activate this subnet.
(mO) ∀t ∈ To : (−→o , t) ∈ F> ∧ (t,
−−−→
ν(t)0) ∈ F>
With the constraints (mSi) and (mSn), we move the active token through the
subnets, or back to the original net, respectively. Therefore, we let all equally
labelled transitions of the subnet take their corresponding activation token from
the place
−−→
ν(t)i for a label t ∈ T and move it to the next subnet, i.e., place
−−−−→
ν(t)i+1
or −→o , respectively.
(mSi) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} : ∀t ∈ T :
∀t> ∈ T>i : λ(t>) = t =⇒ ((
−−→
ν(t)i, t
>) ∈ F> ∧ (t>,−−−−→ν(t)i+1) ∈ F>)
(mSn) ∀t ∈ T : ∀t> ∈ T>n : λ(t>) = t =⇒ ((
−−−→
ν(t)n, t
>) ∈ F> ∧ (t>,−→o ) ∈ F>)
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The initial marking of N> is defined by constraint (in). We only activate the
original part of the net and allow all subnets to track a chain.
(in) In> = {−→o } ∪ {[ι]i | i ∈ I} ∪ In.
Newly introduced identifiers, e.g., ι and −→o , are unique and do not occur in N.
The results of Lemma 1 directly follows from this construction. Having a copy
of each original place for each flow subformula and an activation place for each
original transition yields the quadratic number of places in the size of the net
and the number of subformulas. The cubic number of the transitions in the size
of the net and the number of subformulas follows from the possible quadratic
number of transits of each transition and that for each flow subformula and for
each transit a new transition is added.
Proof (Lemma 1 (Size of the Constructed Net)). The injectivity of ν yields that
each demanded place or transition is a unique element ofP> orT> respectively.
That we demand the smallest sets P> and T> fulfilling the constraints allows
to only consider the explicitly stated elements.
Therewith, constraint (o) together with constraint (a) yield |P>o | = |P|+ 1.
Constraint (s1) demands |P| places for each subnet, constraint (s2) demands one
initial place for every subnet, and constraint (a) requires one active place for each
original transition for every subnet. Hence, |⋃i=1,...,nP>i | = n · |P|+n+n · |T|
and so P> = n · (|P|+ |T|+ 2) + |P|+ 1.
For the transitions of the original part of the net, constraint (o) directly yields
|T>o | = |T|. Constraint (s3) demands a transition for every newly created flow
chain of the net, i.e., |{(t, p) ∈ T×P | (B, p) ∈ Υ (t)}| many transitions, which
are at most |T| · |P| transitions for each subnet. Constraint (s4) does the same
for every transit of the net, i.e., |{(p, t, q) ∈ P ×T ×P | (p, q) ∈ Υ (t)}| many
transitions, which are at most |P|·|T|·|P| transitions for each subnet. Constraint
(s5) requires one transition for skipping and directly moving the active token to
the next subnet. Hence, |⋃i=1,...,nT>i | = n · |T| · |P|+n · |P| · |T| · |P|+n · |T|
and thus, T> contains n · (|P|2 · |T|+ |P| · |T|+ |T|) + |T| transitions. uunionsq
B.2 Formal Construction of the Formula Transformation
We formally introduce the transformation of a Flow-LTL formula ϕ to an LTL
formula ϕ>. We use the abbreviation φ1W φ2 for φ1 ∨ (φ1 Uφ2) and the oper-
ator [φ′1/φ1, . . . , φ
′
m/φm] on formulas for the simultaneous substitution of φj by
φ′j . To substitute formulas from the inner- to the outermost, we utilise the func-
tion d, which calculates the depth of a formula. The depth-function d is induc-
tively defined: d(a) = 0 for every atomic proposition a and d(◦φ1) = 1 + d(φ1),
d(φ1◦˜φ2) = 1 + max{d(φ1), d(φ1)} for every unary operator ◦, binary operator
◦˜, and formulas φ1 and φ2.
Definition 2 (Flow-LTL to LTL). Let N = (P,T,F, In, Υ ) be a Petri net
with transits, ϕ a Flow-LTL formula with n ∈ N subformulas Aψi, for i =
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1, . . . , n, and N> = (P>,T>,F>,F>I , In
>) the with Definition 1 created P/T
Petri net with inhibitor arcs. The corresponding LTL formula ϕ> is created by
the following steps.
Flow part: For each flow formula Aψi, for i = 1, . . . , n, we create a new for-
mula ψ
PTXdmax
i which adequately copes with the different timelines of the corre-
sponding flow chains. Since in our approach each flow formula is checked on the
corresponding subnet N>i , the places and transitions of the other components are
ignored.
The atomic propositions p ∈ P are substituted with the corresponding places
of the subnet:
(pF) ψPi
def .
= ψi
 [ν(p1)]i /p1,. . . ,
[ν(pm)]i /pm
 for P = {p1, . . . , pm}.
For the atomic propositions t ∈ T, we skip all transitions not concerning the
extension of the current flow chain via an until operator. That means the firing
of unrelated transitions Oi = (T
> \T>i ) ∪ {ν(t)Vi ∈ T>i | t ∈ T}, i.e.,
transitions of the other components or own skipping transitions, are skipped until
a related, i.e., one of the set of transitions extending the flow chain Mi(t) =
{t> ∈ T>i \ {ν(t)Vi} | λ(t>) = t}, is fired.
(tF) ψPTi
def .
= ψPi
 (
∨
to∈Oi to)U (
∨
t∈Mi(t1) t)/t1,
. . . ,
(
∨
to∈Oi to)U (
∨
t∈Mi(tm′ ) t)/tm′
 for T = {t1, . . . , tm′}.
The next operator is treated similarly. Let ψPTi contain m1 subformulas ψ
′
j
for j = 1, . . . ,m1. In this case, the related transitions are all transitions of the
subnet T>i but the skipping transitions: Mi = T
>
i \ {ν(t)Vi ∈ T>i | t ∈ T}.
We define the disjunction of all related transitions by M˜i =
∨
t∈Mi t and apply
the same ideas as in the previous case. To adequately cope with situations where
no related transition t ∈Mi would ever fire again ((¬M˜i)), i.e., the stuttering
at the end of a chain, we require the immediate satisfaction. To replace the
formulas from the inner- to the outermost, we organize the formulas in groups
{ ψl1, . . . , ψlkl} according to their depth:
(nF) Let { ψl1, . . . , ψlkl} = { ψ′j | j ∈ {1, . . . ,m1} ∧ d( ψ′j) = l} and
d ∈ {2, . . . , dmax} with dmax def .= max{d( ψ′j) | j ∈ {1, . . . ,m1}}. Then,
the substitutions of the next operators is given by
ψPTX1i
def .
= ψPTi
 ((
∨
t∈Oi t)U (M˜i ∧ ψ11)) ∨ ((¬M˜i) ∧ ψ11)/ ψ11 ,
. . . ,
((
∨
t∈Oi t)U (M˜i ∧ ψ1k1)) ∨ ((¬M˜i) ∧ ψ1k1)/ ψ1k1

and
ψPTXdi
def .
= ψ
PTXd−1
i
 ((
∨
t∈Oi t)U (M˜i ∧ ψd1)) ∨ ((¬M˜i) ∧ ψd1)/ ψd1 ,
. . . ,
((
∨
t∈Oi t)U (M˜i ∧ ψdkd)) ∨ ((¬M˜i) ∧ ψdkd)/ ψdkd

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Run part: They same ideas are applied for the run part of the formula. Here
the atomic propositions p ∈ P do not need to be substituted since P>o = P
holds. For the atomic propositions t ∈ T however, the skipping procedure has
to be applied as well. The unrelated transitions in this case are all transitions
of the subnet O = T> \ T. To only substitute occurrences in the run part of
the formula, we introduce the substitution operator /A¯ which does not change
anything within the scope of the flow operator A.
(tR) ϕT
def .
= ϕ
 (∨t∈O t)U t1/A¯t1,. . . ,
(
∨
t∈O t)U tm/A¯tm
.
For the next operator in the run part of the formula, the related transition are
all transitions of N>O , i.e., T. We define the disjunction of these transitions
by T =
∨
t∈T t. To adequately cope with situations where no transition t ∈
T would ever fire again ((¬T )), i.e., the stuttering in the traces for finite
firing sequences, we require the immediate satisfaction. Let the run part of ϕT
contain m2 subformulas ϕj for j = 1, . . . ,m2. We again organize the formulas
according to their depth, to replace them from the inner- to the outermost.
(nR) Let { ϕl1, . . . , ϕlkl} = { ϕj | j ∈ {1, . . . ,m2} ∧ d( ϕj) = l} and
d′ ∈ {2, . . . , d′max} with d′max def .= max{d( ϕj) | j ∈ {1, . . . ,m2}}. Then, the
substitutions of the next operators is given by
ϕTX1
def .
= ϕT
 ((∨t∈O t)U (T ∧ ϕ11)) ∨ ((¬T ) ∧ ϕ11)/A¯ ϕ11,. . . ,
((
∨
t∈O t)U (T ∧ ϕk11)) ∨ ((¬T ) ∧ ϕ1k1)/A¯ ϕ1k1

and
ϕTXd′
def .
= ϕTXd′−1
 ((∨t∈O t)U (T ∧ ϕd′1 )) ∨ ((¬T ) ∧ ϕd′1 )/A¯ ϕd′1 ,. . . ,
((
∨
t∈O t)U (T ∧ ϕd
′
kd′
)) ∨ ((¬T ) ∧ ϕd′kd′ )/A¯ ϕd
′
kd′

Since flow chains can be created at any time during the run, we skip to their
creation point, i.e., to the time [ι]i is not occupied anymore. To also allow for
not tracking any chain the weak until operator is used.
(AR) ϕA def .= ϕTXd′max
 [ι]1W ψPTXdmax1 /Aψ1,. . . ,
[ι]nW ψ
PTXdmax
n /Aψn

Since we do not want any run or firing sequence to stop in any subnet N>i , the
final formula restricts the considered traces to those which infinitely often visit
the activation place −→o of the original part of the net.
(nSub) ϕ>
def .
= ♦−→o → ϕA
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The idea of the proof of Lemma 2 directly results from Lemma 1, since the
substitution of elements of ϕ depends on the size of N>. This net is quartic in
the size of N and the number of flow subformulas in ϕ.
Proof (Lemma 2 (Size of the Constructed Formula)). For each occurrence of
an atomic proposition t ∈ T in the run part of ϕ, we have additionally 1 +
2 · |T> \T| − 1 subformulas in ϕ> by constraint (tR). Since T> is quartic in
the size of N and n, ϕ> is already quintic in the size of N and ϕ. For each
occurrence of an atomic proposition t ∈ T in a flow subformula of ϕ we have
additionally 1 + 2 · (|T> \Ti| + |T|) − 1 + 2 · (|Mi(t)|) − 1 subformulas in ϕ>
(constraint (tF)). Since Mi(t) are at most |P|2 + |P| transits of a transition
T> is still the biggest part and we are quintic in the size of N and ϕ. For
each occurrence of a next operator in the run part of ϕ we have additionally
2 + 1 + 2 · |T> \T|− 1 + 3 + |T|+ 1 + 3 + 1 + |T| subformulas in ϕ> (constraint
(nR)). Hence, ϕ> is still quintic in the size of N and ϕ. For each occurrence
of a next operator in a flow subformula of ϕ we have additionally 2 + 1 + 2 ·
(|T> \Ti|+ |T|)− 1 + 3 + |Ti| − |T|+ 1 + 3 + 1 + |Ti| − |T| subformulas in ϕ>
(constraint (nF)). Hence, ϕ> is still quintic in the size of N and ϕ. uunionsq
B.3 Correctness Proof of the Transformations
In this section, we prove Lemma 3. Hence, we fix a Petri net with transits
N = (P,T,F, In), the corresponding Petri net with inhibitor arcs N> =
(P>,T>,F>,F>I , In
>) which is created by Definition 1, a Flow-LTL formula
ϕ with n ∈ N subformulas Aψi, for i = 1, . . . , n, and the corresponding LTL
formula ϕ> which is created by Definition 2.
The general idea is to show the contraposition of the statement:
N 6|= ϕ iff N> 6|=LTL ϕ>.
Therefore, we transform the counterexamples mutually by Definition 3 and Def-
inition 4. For Definition 3, we sequentially pump up the firing sequence serving
as counterexample for N |= ϕ by one transition for each subnet in every step.
If the subnet has to consider a flow chain, i.e., β, σ(ζ) 6|= Aψi and the original
transition transits the flow chain, the corresponding transition of the subnet is
used. Otherwise, the corresponding skipping transition is added. The markings
are extended to the additional tokens of N>.
Definition 3 (CEX: From PNwT to PN). Let β = (NR, ρ) be a run of N,
ζ = M0[t0〉M1[t1〉 · · · a covering firing sequence, and for every β, σ(ζ) 6|= Aψi
be ξi = pi0, t
i
0, p
i
1, t
i
1, . . . the corresponding flow chain with σ(ξ
i) 6|=LTL ψi. We lift
the function ρ to sets X by ρ>(X) = {ρ>(x) | x ∈ X}. We create a tuple
β> = (N>
R
, ρ>) and a sequence ζ> = M>0 [t
>
0 〉M>1 [t>1 〉 · · · iteratively.
(i) The marking M>0 corresponds to the initial marking of N
>, i.e., ρ>(M>0 ) =
In>.
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(ii) Every (n+1)th transition is the next transition of ζ. Thus, t>j·(n+1) = tj with
ρ>(tj·(n+1)) = ρ(tj) for every j ∈ N (as long as tj is existent in ζ).
(iii) Every other transition t = t>j·(n+1)+i, for the existing tj and i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
is a fresh transition . The mapping of t is dependent on the previous original
transition to = ρ(t
>
j·(n+1)) ∈ T>o = T. In the case of β, σ(ζ) |= Aψi, no
chain has to be considered, thus t is mapped to the corresponding skipping
transition (i.e., ρ>(t) = ν(to)Vi). In the case of β, σ(ζ) 6|= Aψi the mapping
is done iteratively according to ξi. The first occurrence of (B, ρ(pi0)) ∈ Υ (to)
yields ρ>(t) = ν(to)ν(ρ(pi0))i . We remember this position by Θi(ζ, 0) = j(n+
1)+i+1. Then, whenever the next transition to with (ρ(p
i
k), ρ(p
i
k+1)) ∈ Υ (to)
occurs, ρ>(t) = ν(to)(ν(pik),ν(pik+1))i is used. This position is remembered with
Θi(ζ, k) = j(n+ 1) + i+ 1. In all other cases, ρ
>(t) = ν(to)Vi holds again.
(iv) Each marking M>k of ζ
> for k ∈ N \ {0} is corresponding to a marking
M ′k
>
= ρ(M>k−1) \ preN
>
(ρ(t>k−1)) ∪ postN
>
(ρ(t>k−1)) (as long as t
>
k−1 has
been created), i.e., ρ>(M>k ) = M
′
k
>
.
The net N>
R
is created iteratively out of the places of the markings M>j and
the transitions t>j of ζ
> which are connected according to the pre- and postsets
of ρ>(t>j ). We denote this construction with Θ(ζ) = ζ
>.
Note that the constructed tuple β> = (N>
R
, ρ>) is indeed a run ofN> and the
constructed sequence ζ> is a firing sequence covering β>.
The firing sequence serving as counterexample for N |= ϕ is gained from a
covering ζ> of a run of N> by projecting onto the elements of N. The flow
chains serving as counterexample for β, σ(ζ) |= Aψi are created by iteratively
concatenating the corresponding places and the transitions different to the skip-
ping transition of each subnet.
Definition 4 (CEX: From PN to PNwT). Let β> = (N>
R
, ρ>) be a run
of N> and ζ> = M>0 [t
>
0 〉M>1 [t>1 〉 · · · a covering firing sequence.
(i) We create a sequence ζ = M0[t0〉M1[t1〉 · · · by projecting onto the elements
of N, i.e., Mj = {p ∈ M>j·(n+1) | ρ>(p) ∈ P} and tj = t>j·(n+1) for all
j ∈ N (as long as M>j·(n+1) and t>j·(n+1) are existent in ζ>).
(ii) The net NR is analogously created as in Definition 3 and ρ is defined by
ρ(p) = ρ>(p) for all p ∈ Mj and ρ(tj) = ρ>(t>j·(n+1)) for all j ∈ N (as long
as the elements exist).
(iii) The flow chain ξi = pi0, t
i
0, p
i
1, t
i
1, . . . for a subnet i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is only created
when there is any transition t>j in ζ
> with ρ>(t>j ) = t
> for any t> ∈ T>i with
ν(t>) 6= ν(λ(t>))Vi . In the case that there are such t>j , we iteratively collect
the corresponding transitions and their to the transit belonging corresponding
places of the pre- and postset. This means, if ν(t>) = ν(λ(t>))ν(q)i for any
q ∈ P, add q, and if ν(t>) = ν(λ(t>))(ν(p),ν(q))i for any p, q ∈ P, then add
λ(t>), q to the sequence. For each adding step k, we remember the position
in ζ> by Θ>i (ζ
>, k) = j + 1. We denote the construction by Θ>ξi(ζ
>) = ξi.
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For this construction we denote Θ>R(ζ
>) = (NR, ρ) and Θ>(ζ>) = ζ.
Note that the constructed tuple β = (N>, ρ) indeed is a run of N, the con-
structed sequences ξj are flow chains of N, and the constructed sequence ζ is a
covering firing sequence of β.
We prove Lemma 3 via a nested structural induction over the Flow-LTL for-
mula ϕ. Therefore, we use the LTL part and the flow part of ϕ as induction base
for the outer induction, and prove each part separately by structural induction.
Lemma 5 (LTL Part). Given an LTL formula ψ> created by Definition 2
without condition (nSub) from the LTL part ψ (not within the scope of a flow
operator A) of a flow-LTL formula ϕ.
(s) Given a run β and a covering firing sequence ζ, with σ(Θ(ζ))i |=LTL −→o
for all i ∈ N, then σ(ζ) 6|=LTL ψ =⇒ σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ψ> holds.
(c) Given a firing sequence ζ> of a run of the net N> with σ(ζ>)i |=LTL −→o
for all i ∈ N, then σ(ζ>) 6|=LTL ψ> =⇒ σ(Θ>(ζ>)) 6|=LTL ψ holds.
Proof (via structural induction over ψ). For proving (s) and (c), we show sound-
ness, i.e.,
∀i ∈ N : σ(ζ)i 6|=LTL ψ =⇒ ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} : σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>,
and completeness, i.e.,
∀i ∈ N : ∃j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} : σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ> =⇒ σ(Θ>(ζ>))i 6|=LTL ψ
with n0 =
{
0 if i = 0
n otherwise
hold by an induction over the structure of ψ .
(IB) Case ψ = p ∈ P. Definition 2 yields ψ> = p.
Regarding soundness: Let ζ = M0[t0〉M1[t1〉 · · · and Θ(ζ) = M>0 [t>0 〉M>1 [t>1 〉 · · ·
with the corresponding mapping functions ρ and ρ>, respectively. The premise
of the statement yields p 6∈ σ(ζ)(i). For i = 0, condition ( in) of Definition 1 to-
gether with condition (i) of Definition 3 ensures that ρ(M0) ⊂ ρ>(M>0 ) and that
there cannot be any other p′ ∈ M>0 with ρ>(p′) ∈ P. Hence, p 6∈ σ(Θ(ζ))(0).
For i > 0, condition (iv) of Definition 3 yields that all other markings M>k are
mapped to markings which are created by the firing of transitions of N>. Defi-
nition 1 ensures that tokens residing on places p ∈ P>o ∩P of the original part
of the net are not moved by transitions of the subnet. Hence, by p 6∈ σ(ζ)(i) we
know that p cannot get occupied while firing any transition of the subnet. With
condition (ii) and (iii) of Definition 3 we know p 6∈ σ(Θ(ζ))(i(n+ 1)− j) for all
j ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
Regarding completeness: Given ζ> = M>0 [t
>
0 〉M>1 [t>1 〉 · · · and its transformation
Θ>(ζ>) = M0[t0〉M1[t1〉 · · · with the corresponding mapping functions ρ and
ρ>, respectively. For i = 0, the premise yields p 6∈ σ(ζ>)(0). From condition
(i) of Definition 4, we know that M0 = {p> ∈ M>0 | ρ>(p>) ∈ P} and since
p ∈ P and condition (ii) of the definition ensures that both mapping functions
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coincide, p 6∈ σ(Θ>(ζ>). For all other i ∈ N, the premise yields that there is
a j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} such that p 6∈ σ(ζ>)(i(n + 1) − j). Definition 1 ensures that
every firing sequence of N> repeatedly has an original transition to ∈ T>o and
then sequentially n transitions, one for each subnet. Furthermore, no transition
of any subnet moves a token of the original net (apart from −→o ). Thus, for all
j′ ∈ {0, . . . , n0} the places p ∈ P of the markings of σ(ζ>)(i(n+1)−j′) stay the
same. Since Definition 4 creates the markings for Θ>(ζ>) exactly by choosing
those corresponding places and maps them accordingly, p 6∈ σ(Θ>(ζ>)(i(n+1)).
Case ψ = t ∈ T. Definition 2 yields ψ> = ∨t′∈T>\T t′ U t.
Regarding soundness: For all i ∈ N the premise yields t 6∈ σ(ζ)(i). Since con-
dition (ii) of Definition 3 copies every (n + 1)th transition we firstly know
that t 6∈ σ(Θ(ζ))(i(n + 1)) and secondly σ(Θ(ζ))(i(n + 1)) ∩ T> = ∅. Thus,
σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1) 6|=LTL ψ>. For i = 0 this already yields the conclusion. In the case
that i > 0, condition (iii) of Definition 3 ensures that for all j ∈ {0, . . . , n} a
transition is added which maps to a transition of the subnet T> \T. Hence,
σ(Θ(ζ))(i(n+ 1)− j) ∩T = for all j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, and so σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL
ψ>.
Regarding completeness: The premise yields that there is a j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} such
that σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL
∨
t′∈T>\T t
′ U t. Definition 1 yields that every trace of
N> must contain at position i(n+1) a transition to ∈ T>o = T or no transition
at all. Thus, for i = 0 we know from the premise t 6∈ σ(ζ>)(0). Definition 4 keeps
for all i(n + 1) positions the transitions and the mapping for Θ>(ζ>). Hence,
t 6∈ σ(Θ>(ζ>))(0). For i > 0, from Definition 1 follows that σ(ζ>)(i(n+ 1)− j)
belong to some subnet and for all next positions until position i(n+ 1)− 1 only
transitions t′ belonging to subnets can possibly be fired, i.e., t′ ∈ T> \T. Thus,
with the premise t 6∈ σ(ζ>)(i(n + 1). With the same argument as for the i = 0
case, t 6∈ σ(Θ>(ζ>))(i).
(IS) Let ψ>1 and ψ
>
2 be created from flow formulas ψ1 and ψ2 by Definition 2
without (nSub).
Case ψ = ¬ψ1. Since Definition 2 does not concern the negation ψ> = ¬ψ>1 .
Regarding soundness: The premise yields σ(ζ)i |=LTL ψ1 and because Θ>(Θ(ζ)) =
ζ, this also can be stated as σ(Θ>(Θ(ζ)))i |=LTL ψ1. Then the contraposition of
the completeness part of the induction hypothesis yields ¬(∃j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} :
σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>1 ). Thus, σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)−j |=LTL ψ>1 for all of those j,
and so it is not satisfied for the negation, i.e., ψ>.
Regarding completeness: The premise states the existence of a j ∈ {0, . . . , n0}
with σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j |=LTL ψ>1 ). Since Θ(Θ>(ζ>)) = ζ>, the contraposition of the
soundness part of the induction hypothesis yields σ(Θ>(ζ>))i |=LTL ψ1. Hence,
σ(Θ>(ζ>))i 6|=LTL ψ.
Case ψ = ψ1∧ψ2. Since Definition 2 does not concern the conjunction operator
ψ> = ψ>1 ∧ ψ>2 .
Regarding soundness: The premise and the induction hypothesis for sound-
ness yield that either ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} : σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>1 or ∀j ∈
{0, . . . , n0} : σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>2 holds. The universal quantifier can be
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moved to the outer level. Hence, ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} : σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>1 ∧
ψ>2 .
Regarding completeness: The premise states that there is j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} such
that σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>1 or σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>1 holds. We move the exis-
tential quantifier to the inner level and together with the induction hypothesis for
the soundness part we know that σ(Θ>(ζ>))i 6|=LTL ψ1 or σ(Θ>(ζ>))i 6|=LTL ψ2
holds. Hence, σ(Θ>(ζ>))i 6|=LTL ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
Case ψ = ψ1. Definition 2 yields ψ
> = (
∨
t′∈T>\T t
′)U (
∨
t∈T t ∧ ψ>1 ) ∨
( (¬∨t∈T t) ∧ ψ>1 ).
Regarding soundness: The premise yields σ(ζ)i 6|=LTL ψ1, i.e., σ(ζ)i+1 6|=LTL ψ1.
The soundness part of the induction hypothesis ensures that the statement
(*) σ(Θ(ζ))(i+1)(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>1 holds for all j ∈ {0, . . . , n0}. We show the con-
clusion by contradiction. Assume, σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)−j
′ |=LTL ψ> for some of those
j′. In the case that the first disjunct is satisfied, condition (iii) of Definition 3
ensures if j′ > 0 that only transitions of the subnet are added. Those are skipped
by the until and since at position i(n+ 1) condition (ii) of Definition 3 ensures
that only t ∈ T can occur σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1) |=LTL
∨
t∈T t ∧ ψ>1 . This is directly
given if j′ = 0. Hence, σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)+1 |=LTL ψ>1 which is a contradiction to (*)
for j = n. If the second disjunct is satisfied, we know by (¬∨t∈T t) that never
an original transition will occur in the future. Because of Definition 3 this is only
possible if ζ is finite, and therewith also Θ(ζ). Thus, from i(n+ 1)− j on Θ(ζ)
is stuttering and so all atomic propositions stay the same in the future. This
is a contradiction to (*), since ψ>1 currently holds and therewith for the whole
future.
Regarding completeness: The premise states the existence of a j ∈ {0, . . . , n0}
with σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL (
∨
t′∈T>\T t
′)U (
∨
t∈T t∧ ψ>1 )∨ ( (¬
∨
t∈T t)∧ψ>1 ).
For j > 0, Definition 1 ensures that the starting position of the trace corresponds
to a situation with an active subnet. Furthermore, it ensures that only transition
t′ of the subnet can be used until position i(n+ 1), i.e., t′ ∈ T> \T. Since those
are skipped within the first disjunct, this yields σ(ζ>)i(n+1) 6|=LTL
∨
t∈T t∧ ψ>1 .
For j = 0 this directly holds, since Definition 1 forces every trace of N> to
start with a transition t ∈ T or to contain no transition at all. Since position
i(n + 1) belongs to situations where it is the turn of the original part of the
net, either no original transition is ever fired again (see case of the other dis-
junct) or σ(ζ>)i(n+1)+1 6|=LTL ψ>1 . For j′ = n the induction hypothesis yields
σ(Θ>(ζ>))i+1 6|=LTL ψ1 and so σ(Θ>(ζ>))i 6|=LTL ψ. If no original transition
is ever fired again, the second disjunct yields σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>1 . Since
Definition 1 yields that only transitions t ∈ T are firable in the i(n + 1) po-
sitions of the trace, this situation must correspond to the stuttering of the
trace. Since all atomic propositions stay the same during the stuttering we know
σ(ζ>)i(n+1)+1 6|=LTL ψ>1 . Hence, like in the other case the induction hypothesis
yields the conclusion.
Case ψ = ψ1 Uψ2. Since Definition 2 does not concern the until operator
ψ> = ψ>1 Uψ
>
2 .
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Regarding soundness: The premise yields ∀k ≥ 0 : σ(ζ)i+k 6|=LTL ψ2∨∃0 ≤ l < k :
σ(ζ)i+l 6|=LTL ψ1. The induction hypothesis applied for all these ks and ls yields:
∀k ≥ 0 : ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} : σ(Θ(ζ))(i+k)(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>2 ∨ ∃0 ≤ l < k : ∀j ∈
{0, . . . , n0} : σ(Θ(ζ))(i+l)(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>1 . For any k we know that starting from
i(n+1) either all k(n+1)−j steps are not satisfying ψ>2 or there is an 0 ≤ l < k
such that all l(n + 1) − j steps are not satisfying ψ>1 . Since the j ensures that
this exactly holds for all steps between k and k+ 1, we can also shift the indices
such that ∀k ≥ 0 : ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} : σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)+k−j 6|=LTL ψ>2 ∨ ∃0 ≤ l < k :
∀j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} : σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)+l−j 6|=LTL ψ>1 holds. By moving the universal
quantifier of the j to the outside, we obtain the semantical definition of the until
operator. Hence, ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} : σ(Θ(ζ))i(n+1)−j 6|=LTL ψ>1 Uψ>2 .
Regarding completeness: The premise yields that there is a j ∈ {0, . . . , n0} with
∀k ≥ 0 : σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j+k 6|=LTL ψ>2 ∨ ∃0 ≤ l < k : σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j+l 6|=LTL ψ>1 .
We can move the existential quantifier for the j inwards, i.e., ∀k ≥ 0 : ∃j ∈
{0, . . . , n0} : σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j+k 6|=LTL ψ>2 ∨ ∃0 ≤ l < k : ∃j′ ∈ {0, . . . , n0} :
σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j
′+l 6|=LTL ψ>1 . Since this holds for every k and thus, especially
for every k(n + 1). Since the existence of the j′ can be used to alter the in-
dex to the previously existing position l for every k we know ∀k ≥ 0 : ∃j ∈
{0, . . . , n0} : σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j+k(n+1) 6|=LTL ψ>2 ∨ ∃0 ≤ l < k : ∃j′ ∈ {0, . . . , n0} :
σ(ζ>)i(n+1)−j
′+l(n+1) 6|=LTL ψ>1 . The induction hypothesis then yields ∀k ≥ 0 :
σ(Θ>(ζ>))i+k 6|=LTL ψ2 ∨ ∃0 ≤ l < k : σ(Θ>(ζ>))i+l 6|=LTL ψ1, which is the se-
mantical definition of the conclusion. uunionsq
Lemma 6 (Flow Part). Given an LTL formula ψ> created by Definition 2
without condition (nSub) from a flow formula Aψi of a flow-LTL formula ϕ.
(s) Given a run β and a covering firing sequence ζ, with σ(Θ(ζ))j |=LTL −→o
for all j ∈ N, then β, σ(ζ) 6|= Aψi =⇒ σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ψ> holds.
(c) Given a firing sequence ζ> of a run of the net N> with σ(ζ>)j |=LTL −→o
for all j ∈ N, then σ(ζ>) 6|=LTL ψ> =⇒ Θ>R(ζ>), σ(Θ>(ζ>)) 6|= Aψi holds.
Proof (via structural induction over ψi). We know from Definition 2 that ψ
> =
[ι]iW ψ
>
i where ψ
>
i is created from ψi by the constraints (pF), (tF), and (nF).
Since the operator W is an abbreviation ψ> = ([ι]i Uψ
>
i ) ∨ [ι]i.
Regarding (s). The premise yields that there is a flow chain ξi = pi0, t
i
0, p
i
1, t
i
1, . . .
such that σ(ξi) 6|=LTL ψi. Since there is a chain, Definition 3 yields the existence
of a transition t in Θ(ζ) at position Θi(ζ, 0)− 1 starting the chain, i.e., ρ>(t) =
ν(to)ν(ρ(pi0))i for an original transition to ∈ T>o = T with (B, ρ(pi0)) ∈ Υ (to).
Condition (s3) of Definition 1 ensures that at position Θi(ζ, 0) the place [ι]i is
unoccupied. Hence, σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL [ι]i. Furthermore, from condition (in) follows
that [ι]i is initially marked. Definition 3 states that t is the first occurrence of
such kind and Definition 1 ensure that no other kind takes a token from [ι]i.
Thus, [ι]i is satisfied until position Θi(ζ, 0). Hence, we only have to show that
in such situations σ(Θ(ζ))Θi(ζ,0) 6|=LTL ψ>i holds.
Regarding (c). The premise states that σ(ζ>) 6|=LTL ([ι]i Uψ>i ) ∨ [ι]i holds.
Since σ(ζ>) 6|=LTL [ι]i Definition 1 yields the existence of a transition t in
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ζ> with ρ>(t) = ν(to)ν(q)i for an original transition to ∈ T> = T and a
place q ∈ P with (B, q) ∈ Υ (to). Thus, Definition 4 yield the existence of a
flow chain Θ>ξi(ζ
>) and that the first place of the chain correspond to index
Θ>i (ζ
>, 0). Since we know that until this position [ι]i is satisfied, the premise
yields σ(ζ>)Θ
>
i (ζ
>,0) 6|=LTL ψ>i . Hence, we have to show that in those situations
σ(Θ>ξi(ζ
>))0 6|=LTL ψi holds.
We show these two cases via an induction over ψi. We define two sets ∆ =
{Θi(ζ, k), . . . , Θi(ζ, k+ 1)} and ∆> = {Θ>i (ζ>, k), . . . , Θ>i (ζ>, k+ 1)} and show
that soundness, i.e.,
∀k ∈ N : σ(ξ)k 6|=LTL ψi =⇒ ∀j ∈ ∆ : σ(Θ(ζ))j 6|=LTL ψ>i
and completeness, i.e.,
∀k ∈ N : ∃j ∈ ∆> : σ(ζ>)j 6|=LTL ψ> =⇒ σ(Θ>ξi(ζ>))k 6|=LTL ψi
hold. The induction is similarly to the induction in the proof of Lemma 5. Since
in the (tF) and (nF) constraints of Definition 2 also all time points are skipped
which do not concern the current part of the formula, the different time lines are
handled properly. The difference in this case is that not after exactly n steps the
entry concern the current part of the formula but there could be more rounds
not concerning the considered flow chain. This is adequately handled by allowing
the skipping transition in Oi. We cannot skip in situations where we should not
skip, i.e., in this round a transition to ∈ To has fired which moves the current
chain, because of the inhibitor arcs of the skipping transition. Another key part
is that, as for the LTL part, the tokens of the subnet (apart from the active one)
are independent from every firing of any transition of the other subnets. uunionsq
Lemma 7 (Soundness). Given a run β, a covering firing sequence ζ, and an
LTL formula ϕ> created by Definition 2 from a flow-LTL formula ϕ. Then:
β, σ(ζ) 6|= ϕ =⇒ σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ϕ>
Proof (via structural induction over ϕ).
Definition 2 yields that every transformed formula ϕ>
′
is of the form −→o →
ϕA. Since Definition 3 adds for every existing transition in ζ also the n transi-
tions (one for each subnet) to Θ(ζ) (condition (3)) and by condition (mSn) of
Definition 1 every transition of the last subnet puts a token onto −→o , the state-
ment σ(Θ(ζ))i |=LTL −→o is satisfied for every i ∈ N. This also holds for finite
firing sequences, because Definition 3 ensures that the last added transition is
one of the last subnet. The stuttering then yields the satisfaction. Thus, we only
have to show that σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ϕA. Let ϕ> be such a subformula ϕA.
(IB) Case ϕ = ψ, for a standard LTL formula ψ. Lemma 5 directly yields
σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ϕ>. Case ϕ = Aψi. Lemma 6 proves this case.
(IS) Case ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2. Since Definition 2 does not concern the conjunction
operator of the run part, there are subformulas ϕ>1 and ϕ
>
2 with ϕ
> = ϕ>1 ∧ϕ>2 ,
which are created from the corresponding ϕ1 and ϕ2, respectively. The in-
duction hypothesis yields that σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ϕ>1 or σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ϕ>2 , thus
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σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ϕ>1 ∧ ϕ>2 .
Case ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2. Since Definition 2 also does not concern the disjunction
operator of the run part, this case is analogously done as the previous case.
Case ϕ = ψ → ϕ2. Since Definition 2 also does not concern the implica-
tion operator there are subformulas ϕ>1 and ϕ
>
2 with ϕ
> = ϕ>1 → ϕ>2 , which
are created from ψ and ϕ2, respectively. The premise of the statement yields
β, σ(ζ) |= ψ, thus β, σ(ζ) 6|= ¬ψ, and β, σ(ζ) 6|= ϕ2. Since ¬ψ is still a standard
LTL formula, Lemma 5 yields σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ¬ϕ>1 (the Definition 2 does not
concern the negation). The induction hypothesis ensures σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ϕ2, and
so σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ϕ>1 → ϕ>2 . uunionsq
Lemma 8 (Completeness). Given a firing sequence ζ> of a run of N>, and
an LTL formula ϕ> created by Definition 2 from a flow-LTL formula ϕ. Then:
σ(ζ>) 6|=LTL ϕ> =⇒ Θ>R(ζ>), σ(Θ>(ζ>)) 6|= ϕ
Proof (via structural induction over ϕ).
Again, every ϕ>
′
is of the form −→o → ϕA. The premise of the statement
therewith yields σ(ζ>) |=LTL −→o . Every other argument is analog to the
arguments of the proof of Lemma 7. uunionsq
Finally, we are able to prove Lemma 3.
Proof (Lemma 3 (Correctness of the Transformation)).
Regarding soundness: We show the contraposition of the statement:N 6|= ϕ =⇒
N> 6|=LTL ϕ>. Hence, there is a run β of N and a covering firing sequence ζ
such that β, σ(ζ) 6|= ϕ. Lemma 7 yields that the firing sequence Θ(ζ) fulfills
σ(Θ(ζ)) 6|=LTL ϕ>. Thus, there exists a run β> (created from Θ(ζ) by iteratively
adding the places of the markings and the transitions of the firing sequence and
connecting them according their corresponding places and transitions in N>)
which is covered by Θ(ζ), such that β> 6|=LTL ϕ>, and thus N> 6|=LTL ϕ>.
Regarding completeness. We analogously show the contraposition of the state-
ment: N> 6|=LTL ϕ> =⇒ N 6|= ϕ. Hence, there is a run β> of N> and a
covering firing sequence ζ> such that σ(ζ>) 6|=LTL ϕ>. Lemma 8 yields that the
firing sequence Θ>(ζ>) fulfills Θ>R(ζ
>), σ(Θ>(ζ>)) 6|= ϕ. Hence, N 6|= ϕ. uunionsq
B.4 Construction of the Circuit
We formally define the circuit CN for a P/T Petri net with inhibitor arcs N =
(P,T,F,FI , In) and the transformed formula ψ
′ of an LTL formula ψ described
in Sec. 6.3.
For a circuit C = (I ,O,L ,F ) with a Boolean formula F over I ×L ×
O ×L , we use decoration to express the correspondence of the variables in the
second and fourth component L . Thus, if x denotes the current value of a latch
in the second component L then x′ denotes the new value of that latch after the
next clock pulse in the fourth component of L . This decoration is also lifted to
sets. For a tuple (I, L,O, L′) ∈ 2I × 2L × 2O × 2L we say (I, L,O, L′) satisfies
F (denoted by (I, L,O, L′) |= F ) iff F is satisfied under the valuation which
maps each occurring variable to true and all others to false.
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Definition 5 (P/T Petri Net to Circuit). For a P/T Petri net with inhibitor
arcs N = (P,T,F,FI , In), we define the circuit CN = (I ,O,L ,F ) with
the set of input variables I = T, the set of output variables O = {po |
p ∈ P} ∪ {to | t ∈ T} ∪ {eo}, the set of latches L = P ∪ {i, e} with an
initialisation latch i and a latch for invalid inputs e, and a boolean formula
F = outP ∧ outT ∧ oute ∧ latche ∧ latchi ∧ latchP over I ×L × O ×L
which is defined with the help of the following formulas:
val(t)
def .
= t ∧
∧
t1∈T\{t}
¬t1 ∧
∧
p∈•t
{¬p if (p, t) ∈ FI
p otherwise
,
noT
def .
=
∧
t∈T
¬val(t),
succ(p)
def .
= (noT→ p) ∧ (¬noT→
∧
t∈T
(to →
p if p 6∈
•t ∧ p 6∈ t•
0 if p ∈ •t ∧ p 6∈ t•
1 otherwise
)).
The formula val(t) for a t ∈ T states the validity of t, i.e., t is set as input but
no other transition is set and t is enabled by the current state of the latches. The
formula noT is true iff no transition is valid and the formula succ(p) for a place
p ∈ P defines the successor value for p. If there is no valid input we keep the
same marking. Otherwise, the marking is the successor marking of the current
output transition to and the current marking. Therewith, the conjuncts of F are
defined as follows:
outP
def .
=
∧
p∈P
(po ↔ (¬i→ p′) ∧ (i→ p)),
outT
def .
=
∧
t∈T
(to ↔ val(t)),
oute
def .
= eo ↔ e,
latche
def .
= e′ ↔ i ∧ noT,
latchi
def .
= i′ ↔ true,
latchP
def .
=
∧
p∈P
(p′ ↔
{
i→ succ(p) if p ∈ In
i ∧ succ(p) otherwise ).
In all but the initial state, the outputs corresponding to places are the current
values of the latches. The outputs corresponding to the transitions are at most
one valid transition. The new value for the latches corresponding to places are
initially the initial marking of N. Otherwise, if no valid input is applied, the
current values of the latches are copied to the new values and if there is a valid
transition, the successor marking of firing this transition in the current values is
used for the new values.
For all subsets P ⊆ P and T ⊆ T, we define with Po = {po ∈ O | p ∈ P} and
To = {to ∈ O | t ∈ T} the respective sets of the output variables. We define
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the transformed formula ψ′ by skipping the initialisation step and focusing on
the valid traces:
ψ′ = ( (eo → eo)→ ψ˜)
where ψ˜ is obtained from ψ by replacing every place and transition with the
corresponding output variable.
A Kripke structure is a five-tupleK = (A,S, S0,→, `), with a set of atoms A,
a set of states S, a set of initial states S0 ⊆ S, a transition relation →⊆ S × S,
and a labelling function ` : S → 2A. A path pi = pi0pi1 · · · of a Kripke structure is
an infinite sequence of states pii ∈ S for i ∈ N with (pii, pii+1) ∈→. The path pi is
initial iff pi0 ∈ S0. A Kripke structure K satisfies an LTL formula ψ (denoted
by K |= ψ) iff every initial path satisfies ψ.
Definition 6 (Circuit to Kripke Structure). The Kripke structure KC of a
circuit C is defined by KC = (A,S, S0,→, `), with the set of atoms A = O, the
set of states S = 2I×2L×2O×2L , the set of initial states S0 = {(I, ∅, Ino, In ′∪
{i′} | I ⊆ T}, the transition relation →= {((I1, L1, O1, L′1), (I2, L2, O2, L′2)) ∈
S × S | L′1 = L2 ∧ (I2, L2, O2, L′2) |= F}, and the labelling function ` =
{((I, L,O, L′), O) ∈ S × 2O}.
B.5 Correctness of the Constructions
We show the correctness of the construction of the circuit CN and the corre-
sponding Kripke structure KCN by proving N 6|=LTL ψ iff KCN 6|= ψ′. For this
purpose, we mutually transform the respective counterexamples and show their
correspondence on the atomic propositions of ψ and ψ′, respectively. This al-
ready yields the correctness part of Lemma 4. Finally, we have everything at
hand to prove Theorem 1.
Given a trace σ(ζ) of a firing sequence ζ covering a run β of a safe P/T Petri
net with inhibitor arcs N and a path pi = s0s1 · · · of the corresponding Kripke
structure KCN = (A,S, S0,→, `). We say an entry zi = σ(ζ)(i) ∈ 2P∪T of the
trace and an element sj = (Ij , Lj , Oj , L
′
j) ∈ S of the path coincide (denoted by
zi ∼ sj) iff z|T = {t ∈ T | to ∈ Oj ∧ eo 6∈ Oj} and z|P = {p ∈ P | po ∈ Oj}.
Where z|T and z|P are the projections onto the respective sets.
Proof (Lemma 4 (Correctness of the Circuit)). The number of latches and gates
directly follows from Definition 5. No formula has more than two nesting con-
junctions over P or T. The correctness is proven on the corresponding Kripke
structure KCN via contraposition. We show N 6|=LTL ψ iff KCN 6|= ψ′ by trans-
forming the counterexamples.
Soundness: Let N 6|=LTL ψ. Thus, there is a run β = (NR, ρ) and a covering
firing sequence ζ = M0[t0〉M1[t1〉 · · · such that σ(ζ) 6|=LTL ψ. We create a path
pi = pi0pi1 · · · of KCN by pi0 = (∅, ∅, ρ(M0)o, ρ(M0)′ ∪ {i′}) and if ζ is infinite
pii = ({ρ(ti−1)}, ρ(Mi−1) ∪ {i}, {ρ(ti−1)o} ∪ ρ(Mi−1)o, ρ(Mi)′ ∪ {i′})
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for all i ∈ N\{0}. If ζ = M0[t0〉M1[t1〉 · · · [tn−1〉Mn is finite the first n states are
created as above and for the first j > n we define
pij = (∅, ρ(Mn) ∪ {i}, ρ(Mn)o, ρ(Mn)′ ∪ {i′, e′})
and for all other we define pij equally but that the current values of the latches
also contain e and that also eo is set for the outputs.
We show that the sequence pi is indeed an initial path ofKCN . Since ρ(M0) =
In, because ζ covers a run of N, it directly holds pi0 ∈ S0. We show that for
all i ∈ N : (pii, pii+1) ∈→, i.e., L′i = Li+1 and (Ii+1, Li+1, Oi+1, L′i+1) |= F
for pii = (Ii, Li, Oi, L
′
i) and pii+1 = (Ii+1, Li+1, Oi+1, L
′
i+1). The first clause can
directly be seen by the definition of pi. We show that all the defined pii in the
finite as well as the infinite case satisfy F by checking each of the conjuncts:
The conjunct outP is satisfied, because the current values p are set as output
(i is true) and this fits to the definition of pii. The conjunct outT is satisfied,
because ti−1 is enabled in Mi−1 because of ζ and no other transition is set in pii.
The conjunct latchP is satisfied, because succ(p) yields the marking resulting
by firing ti−1 in the current values of the latches (here ρ(Mi−1)) because noT
is not satisfied. Because of ζ, this is ρ(Mi), which fits pii. The other conjuncts
are directly satisfied by the construction. In the case of a finite firing sequence
the defined pij also satisfy F : The conjunct outP is satisfied, with the same
arguments as in the previous case. The conjunct latchP is satisfied, because
noT is satisfied and therewith the current values of the latches are taken and
outT is also satisfied, because no transition is applied to the input. Also because
of noT the conjunct latche is satisfied and with the additional constraints for
all but the first j > n the conjunct oute is satisfied for all i ∈ N. The subpath
pi1 satisfies (eo → eo), because no eo is ever set by the construction in the
case of an infinite ζ and in the other case eo is set for every j + 1 > n. Since
by the construction σ(ζ)(i) ∼ φi+1 directly holds, the path pi does not satisfy
( (eo → eo)→ ψ˜). Hence, KCN 6|= ψ′.
Completeness: LetKCN 6|= ψ′. Thus, there is an initial path pi = pi0pi1 · · · ofKCN
not satisfying ( (eo → eo) → ψ˜). Hence, the subpath pi1 satisfies (eo →
eo) and not ψ˜. In the case that eo 6∈ Oi for all i ∈ N holds, we create a infinite
firing sequence ζ = M0[t0〉M1[t1〉 · · · with ρ(Mi) = {p ∈ P | po ∈ Oi+1} and
ρ(ti) ∈ {t ∈ T | to ∈ Oi+1}. Otherwise, if there is an i ∈ N with eo 6∈ Oi,
say i = n + 1 is the first of such occurrences, we create a finite firing sequence
ζ = M0[t0〉M1[t1〉 · · · [tn−1〉Mn for the first n− 1 steps as before and for the nth
step we define ρ(Mn) = {p ∈ P | po ∈ On+1} as above.
This is indeed a firing sequence, because ρ(M0) = In holds by the definition
of KCN , the construction of ζ, and since pi is initial. All transitions are firable
and yield the respective successor marking because of F , since pi is a path. This
is because the error flag is maximally set in the last step, and thus, there must be
exactly one enabled transition applied to the inputs. Therewith succ(p) yields
the correct successor marking and this is the output of the next step. Since
pi satisfies ( (eo → eo), we know that also in the finite case of ζ it holds
σ(ζ)(i) ∼ φi+1, since in pi the output markings stay the same in situations where
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eo is set, because this is only possible if notT is true. Since pi
1 does not satisfy
ψ˜, σ(ζ) 6|=LTL ψ. Constructing the corresponding run yields the conclusion. uunionsq
Proof (Theorem 1). For a Petri net with transits N and a Flow-LTL formula ϕ,
Lemma 1 and 2 yield the polynomial size of the constructed P/T Petri net with
inhibitor arcs N> and the constructed formula ϕ>. Lemma 3 yields the equiv-
alent satisfiability and Lemma 4 shows the polynomial size of the constructed,
satisfiability-equivalent circuit CN and of the formula ψ′. This results in a Kripke
structure of exponential size, which can be checked in linear time in the size of
the state space and in exponential time in the size of the formula [10]. uunionsq
C Complete Experimental Results
In this section of the appendix, we present the complete experimental results
from the benchmark families presented in Sec. 7. Table 2 is a snapshot of this
table.
Table 4: Experimental results from the benchmark families Switch Failure (SF)
and Redundant Pipeline (RP), and the case study Routing Update (RU). The
results are the average over five runs on an Intel i7-2700K CPU with 3.50 GHz,
32 GB RAM, and a timeout of 30 minutes. For the case study RU, results are
only listed when at least the falsifier had no timeout.
PNwT Translated PN Circuit Result
Ben. Par. #S |P| |T | |ϕ| |P>| |T >| |ψ′| Lat. Gat. Sec. Algo. |=
SF 3 4 4 5 35 17 22 60 90 2796 2.7 IC3 3
4 5 5 6 45 20 26 73 106 3580 8.5 IC3 3
5 6 6 7 55 23 30 86 122 4444 18.8 IC3 3
6 7 7 8 65 26 34 99 138 5388 49.8 IC3 3
7 8 8 9 75 29 38 112 154 6412 128.9 IC3 3
8 9 9 10 85 32 42 125 170 7516 291.9 IC3 3
9 10 10 11 95 35 46 138 186 8700 1359.9 IC3 3
10 11 11 12 105 38 50 151 202 9964 TO - ?
RP 1/1/B 4 4 5 43 17 22 68 100 2989 4.0 IC3 3
1/2/B 5 5 6 53 20 26 81 116 3773 11.0 IC3 3
1/3/B 6 6 7 63 23 30 94 132 4637 16.4 IC3 3
1/4/B 7 7 8 73 26 34 107 148 5581 66.6 IC3 3
1/5/B 8 8 9 83 29 38 120 164 6605 99.3 IC3 3
2/1/B 5 5 6 53 20 26 81 116 3773 4.6 IC3 3
2/2/B 6 6 7 63 23 30 94 132 4637 38.6 IC3 3
2/3/B 7 7 8 73 26 34 107 148 5581 68.4 IC3 3
2/4/B 8 8 9 83 29 38 120 164 6605 133.0 IC3 3
2/5/B 9 9 10 93 32 42 133 180 7709 204.6 IC3 3
3/1/B 6 6 7 63 23 30 94 132 4637 1004.9 IC3 3
3/2/B 7 7 8 73 26 34 107 148 5581 76.2 IC3 3
3/3/B 8 8 9 83 29 38 120 164 6605 192.3 IC3 3
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3/4/B 9 9 10 93 32 42 133 180 7709 310.9 IC3 3
3/5/B 10 10 11 103 35 46 146 196 8893 TO - ?
4/1/B 7 7 8 73 26 34 107 148 5581 77.4 IC3 3
4/2/B 8 8 9 83 29 38 120 164 6605 139.7 IC3 3
4/3/B 9 9 10 93 32 42 133 180 7709 594.7 IC3 3
4/4/B 10 10 11 103 35 46 146 196 8893 646.4 IC3 3
4/5/B 11 11 12 113 38 50 159 212 10157 TO - ?
5/1/B 8 8 9 83 29 38 120 164 6605 126.9 IC3 3
5/2/B 9 9 10 93 32 42 133 180 7709 580.0 IC3 3
5/3/B 10 10 11 103 35 46 146 196 8893 TO - ?
5/4/B 11 11 12 113 38 50 159 212 10157 TO - ?
5/5/B 12 12 13 123 41 54 172 228 11501 TO - ?
1/1/U 6 6 9 63 25 36 100 136 5535 1.6 BMC2 7
1/2/U 7 7 10 73 28 40 113 152 6579 2.7 BMC3 7
1/3/U 8 8 11 83 31 44 126 168 7703 6.3 BMC2 7
1/4/U 9 9 12 93 34 48 139 184 8907 21.1 BMC3 7
1/5/U 10 10 13 103 37 52 152 200 10191 30.6 BMC2 7
2/1/U 7 7 10 73 28 40 113 152 6579 2.3 BMC3 7
2/2/U 8 8 11 83 31 44 126 168 7703 4.2 BMC3 7
2/3/U 9 9 12 93 34 48 139 184 8907 18.4 BMC3 7
2/4/U 10 10 13 103 37 52 152 200 10191 23.7 BMC 7
2/5/U 11 11 14 113 40 56 165 216 11555 105.2 BMC2 7
3/1/U 8 8 11 83 31 44 126 168 7703 8.6 BMC2 7
3/2/U 9 9 12 93 34 48 139 184 8907 14.4 BMC2 7
3/3/U 10 10 13 103 37 52 152 200 10191 22.6 BMC3 7
3/4/U 11 11 14 113 40 56 165 216 11555 70.4 BMC2 7
3/5/U 12 12 15 123 43 60 178 232 12999 180.9 BMC3 7
4/1/U 9 9 12 93 34 48 139 184 8907 15.2 BMC3 7
4/2/U 10 10 13 103 37 52 152 200 10191 49.0 BMC3 7
4/3/U 11 11 14 113 40 56 165 216 11555 75.6 BMC3 7
4/4/U 12 12 15 123 43 60 178 232 12999 144.4 BMC3 7
4/5/U 13 13 16 133 46 64 191 248 14523 883.7 BMC2 7
5/1/U 10 10 13 103 37 52 152 200 10191 38.4 BMC2 7
5/2/U 11 11 14 113 40 56 165 216 11555 87.3 BMC3 7
5/3/U 12 12 15 123 43 60 178 232 12999 182.8 BMC3 7
5/4/U 13 13 16 133 46 64 191 248 14523 945.1 BMC3 7
5/5/U 14 14 17 143 49 68 204 264 16127 TO - ?
1/1/M 6 9 11 63 30 42 106 146 6908 8.1 BMC3 7
1/2/M 7 10 12 73 33 46 119 162 8081 15.4 BMC2 7
1/3/M 8 11 13 83 36 50 132 178 9334 59.1 BMC3 7
1/4/M 9 12 14 93 39 54 145 194 10667 128.5 BMC3 7
1/5/M 10 13 15 103 42 58 158 210 12080 373.2 BMC 7
2/1/M 7 10 12 73 33 46 119 162 8081 11.7 BMC3 7
2/2/M 8 11 13 83 36 50 132 178 9334 45.1 BMC3 7
2/3/M 9 12 14 93 39 54 145 194 10667 149.5 BMC2 7
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2/4/M 10 13 15 103 42 58 158 210 12080 457.5 BMC 7
2/5/M 11 14 16 113 45 62 171 226 13573 TO - ?
3/1/M 8 11 13 83 36 50 132 178 9334 47.3 BMC3 7
3/2/M 9 12 14 93 39 54 145 194 10667 129.9 BMC2 7
3/3/M 10 13 15 103 42 58 158 210 12080 347.0 BMC2 7
3/4/M 11 14 16 113 45 62 171 226 13573 1433.3 BMC3 7
3/5/M 12 15 17 123 48 66 184 242 15146 TO - ?
4/1/M 9 12 14 93 39 54 145 194 10667 121.6 BMC3 7
4/2/M 10 13 15 103 42 58 158 210 12080 370.6 BMC2 7
4/3/M 11 14 16 113 45 62 171 226 13573 1449.6 BMC2 7
4/4/M 12 15 17 123 48 66 184 242 15146 TO - ?
4/5/M 13 16 18 133 51 70 197 258 16799 8.8 BMC3 7
5/1/M 10 13 15 103 42 58 158 210 12080 462.7 BMC2 7
5/2/M 11 14 16 113 45 62 171 226 13573 1740.1 BMC2 7
5/3/M 12 15 17 123 48 66 184 242 15146 TO - ?
5/4/M 13 16 18 133 51 70 197 258 16799 TO - ?
5/5/M 14 17 19 143 54 74 210 274 18532 TO - ?
1/1/C 6 9 11 70 30 42 113 151 7023 63.1 IC3 3
1/2/C 7 10 12 80 33 46 126 167 8196 183.5 IC3 3
1/3/C 8 11 13 90 36 50 139 183 9449 301.7 IC3 3
1/4/C 9 12 14 100 39 54 152 199 10782 565.8 IC3 3
1/5/C 10 13 15 110 42 58 165 215 12195 TO - ?
2/1/C 7 10 12 80 33 46 126 167 8196 105.9 IC3 3
2/2/C 8 11 13 90 36 50 139 183 9449 693.5 IC3 3
2/3/C 9 12 14 100 39 54 152 199 10782 689.3 IC3 3
2/4/C 10 13 15 110 42 58 165 215 12195 TO - ?
2/5/C 11 14 16 120 45 62 178 231 13688 885.8 IC3 3
3/1/C 8 11 13 90 36 50 139 183 9449 451.5 IC3 3
3/2/C 9 12 14 100 39 54 152 199 10782 1252.4 IC3 3
3/3/C 10 13 15 110 42 58 165 215 12195 1218.0 IC3 3
3/4/C 11 14 16 120 45 62 178 231 13688 TO - ?
3/5/C 12 15 17 130 48 66 191 247 15261 TO - ?
4/1/C 9 12 14 100 39 54 152 199 10782 1717.1 IC3 3
4/2/C 10 13 15 110 42 58 165 215 12195 775.1 IC3 3
4/3/C 11 14 16 120 45 62 178 231 13688 TO - ?
4/4/C 12 15 17 130 48 66 191 247 15261 TO - ?
4/5/C 13 16 18 140 51 70 204 263 16914 TO - ?
5/1/C 10 13 15 110 42 58 165 215 12195 TO - ?
5/2/C 11 14 16 120 45 62 178 231 13688 1641.3 IC3 3
5/3/C 12 15 17 130 48 66 191 247 15261 TO - ?
5/4/C 13 16 18 140 51 70 204 263 16914 TO - ?
5/5/C 14 17 19 150 54 74 217 279 18647 TO - ?
RU Arpanet196912T 4 14 10 117 31 39 154 188 7483 22.7 IC3 3
Arpanet196912F 4 14 10 117 31 39 154 188 7483 2.0 BMC3 7
NapnetT 6 23 17 199 48 64 254 292 15875 95.1 IC3 3
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NapnetF 6 23 17 199 48 64 254 292 15875 4.7 BMC3 7
EpochT 6 23 17 199 48 64 254 292 15875 169.2 IC3 3
EpochF 6 23 17 199 48 64 254 292 15875 18.6 BMC3 7
TelecomserbiaT 6 24 18 205 47 59 254 300 14779 492.3 IC3 3
TelecomserbiaF 6 24 18 205 47 59 254 300 14779 51.2 BMC3 7
Layer42T 6 24 18 209 49 65 264 304 16465 597.4 IC3 3
Layer42F 6 24 18 209 49 65 264 304 16465 14.6 BMC3 7
SanrenT 7 24 17 199 50 64 254 296 16177 1353.9 IC3 3
SanrenF 7 24 17 199 50 64 254 296 16177 137.0 BMC3 7
GetnetT 7 25 18 213 53 71 274 312 18601 1418.8 IC3 3
GetnetF 7 25 18 213 53 71 274 312 18601 13.3 BMC3 7
NetrailT 7 30 23 271 62 88 344 380 26101 145.3 IC3 3
NetrailF 7 30 23 271 62 88 344 380 26101 58.3 BMC3 7
Arpanet19706T 9 33 24 281 67 89 354 400 27619 507.8 IC3 3
Arpanet19706F 9 33 24 281 67 89 354 400 27619 49.7 BMC3 7
NsfcnetT 10 31 22 261 65 87 334 376 26181 304.8 IC3 3
NsfcnetF 10 31 22 261 65 87 334 376 26181 8.4 BMC3 7
HeanetT 7 33 26 305 67 97 384 420 30675 TO - ?
HeanetF 7 33 26 305 67 97 384 420 30675 76.8 BMC3 7
Nordu2005T 9 30 21 247 62 80 314 360 23269 TO - ?
Nordu2005F 9 30 21 247 62 80 314 360 23269 48.5 BMC3 7
ClaranetT 15 55 40 473 111 153 594 648 70127 TO - ?
ClaranetF 15 55 40 473 111 153 594 648 70127 213.8 BMC3 7
Garr199901T 16 56 40 473 113 153 594 652 70785 TO - ?
Garr199901F 16 56 40 473 113 153 594 652 70785 795.4 BMC3 7
FatmanT 17 62 45 535 126 176 674 728 89701 TO - ?
FatmanF 17 62 45 535 126 176 674 728 89701 139.3 BMC3 7
Nordu2010T 18 56 38 449 106 133 552 618 57950 TO - ?
Nordu2010F 18 56 38 449 106 133 552 618 57950 136.1 BMC2 7
PacificWaveT 18 68 50 589 135 187 734 796 101171 TO - ?
PacificWaveF 18 68 50 589 135 187 734 796 101171 1707.4 BMC2 7
TwarenT 20 65 45 531 130 170 664 736 87493 TO - ?
TwarenF 20 65 45 531 130 170 664 736 87493 461.5 BMC3 7
MarnetT 20 77 57 679 156 224 854 908 138103 TO - ?
MarnetF 20 77 57 679 156 224 854 908 138103 746.1 BMC3 7
JanetlenseT 20 91 71 847 184 280 1064 1104 203595 TO - ?
JanetlenseF 20 91 71 847 184 280 1064 1104 203595 514.2 BMC2 7
HarnetT 21 71 50 593 143 193 744 812 108415 TO - ?
HarnetF 21 71 50 593 143 193 744 812 108415 919.0 BMC3 7
Belnet2009T 21 71 50 597 145 199 754 816 113397 TO - ?
Belnet2009F 21 71 50 597 145 199 754 816 113397 1163.3 BMC2 7
Garr200404T 22 73 51 607 148 200 764 832 115567 TO - ?
Garr200404F 22 73 51 607 148 200 764 832 115567 79.4 BMC3 7
IstarT 23 73 50 593 147 193 744 820 110051 TO - ?
IstarF 23 73 50 593 147 193 744 820 110051 276.6 BMC3 7
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Garr199905T 23 77 54 641 155 209 804 876 125707 TO - ?
Garr199905F 23 77 54 641 155 209 804 876 125707 157.7 BMC3 7
Garr199904T 23 77 54 641 155 209 804 876 125707 TO - ?
Garr199904F 23 77 54 641 155 209 804 876 125707 460.2 BMC2 7
UranT 24 56 38 449 106 133 552 618 57950 TO - ?
UranF 24 56 38 449 106 133 552 618 57950 143.2 BMC3 7
KentmanFeb2008T 26 82 56 669 167 223 844 920 142291 TO - ?
KentmanFeb2008F 26 82 56 669 167 223 844 920 142291 111.2 BMC3 7
Garr200212T 27 86 59 703 174 232 884 964 153509 TO - ?
Garr200212F 27 86 59 703 174 232 884 964 153509 324.2 BMC3 7
IinetT 31 104 73 871 210 288 1094 1176 227153 TO - ?
IinetF 31 104 73 871 210 288 1094 1176 227153 1244.5 BMC3 7
KentmanJan2011T 38 117 79 943 236 312 1184 1288 269943 TO - ?
KentmanJan2011F 38 117 79 943 236 312 1184 1288 269943 112.6 BMC3 7
